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ABSTRACT 
 
The phenomenon of ‘irregular migration’ by sea or ‘boat migration’ is not new, however, it has 
only recently caught the public’s attention since the Mediterranean ‘migration crisis’ in 2015. 
Historically, travelling by sea has been a dangerous journey for migrants and today, images of 
gruesome scenes of death in the Mediterranean Sea reveal the risks of ‘irregular migration’. 
This study was prompted by the need to provide insight into irregular migration at sea from the 
viewpoint of the irregular migrant by focusing on the perils and risks that are faced by irregular 
migrants on their journeys across the Mediterranean Sea.  
The aims and objectives of this study were to critically analyse the current legal framework 
that seeks to protect irregular migrants from the risks faced on their voyage across the 
Mediterranean Sea and to evaluate the gaps and shortcomings in this respect. The study shows 
that although the crisis of 2015 led to spikes in the death toll, the Mediterranean Sea is still a 
deadly route for irregular migrants today. This fact is followed by findings of all the safety and 
security risks faced by irregular migrants. Having identified all the safety and security risks 
faced at sea, the study goes on to discuss and analyse the legal framework in place that offers 
protection to irregular migrants from these risks. The protection available is then critically 
analysed and protection gaps as well as other shortcomings are identified. 
Following the findings and protection gaps, recommendations are made that creating a new 
binding legislation may be necessary and if not, then the existing legal framework should be 
amended. The existing legal framework should be amended so that it is more comprehensive 
and clarifies the definitions and content of certain key terms that adversely affect the protection 
available to irregular migrants. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Objectives 
This research is relevant as it adds to the existing body of knowledge by providing insight into 
irregular migration at sea from the viewpoint of the irregular migrant. The research focuses on 
the perils and risks that are faced by irregular migrants on the journey across the Mediterranean 
Sea.  
The objectives of this research are to critically analyse the current legal framework that seeks 
to protect irregular migrants from the risks faced on their voyage across the Mediterranean Sea 
and to evaluate the gaps and shortcomings in this respect. After an evaluation has been 
conducted, recommendations are put forth as to how the gaps should be filled to provide 
adequate protection to irregular migrants.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
The following research questions are examined and addressed in this dissertation: 
 
1.2.1 What safety and security risks do irregular migrants face at sea? 
1.2.2 Are there any laws or regulatory measures in place to protect irregular migrants from 
the safety and security risks faced at sea? 
1.2.3 Are irregular migrants adequately protected by the current legal framework? 
 
1.3 Parameters and Research Methodology 
This dissertation will use only the Mediterranean Sea as a case study. The reason for this is to 
limit the study geographically and focus on one of the most problematic regions for irregular 
migration in the world. This allows the study to discuss and analyse the risks faced by irregular 
migrants in more detail as the geographical region is narrowed down.  
The study contains a temporal limit as well. Irregular migration at sea is a major problem that 
reached crisis level in the Mediterranean Sea in the year 2015. This study will focus on the 
period from 2015 to date, to show that irregular migration is still just as much a problem today, 
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as it was in 2015. This temporal limit allows the study to remain relevant and tackle the current 
risks faced by irregular migrants. This paves the way for further research in the field, based on 
the most recent findings and shortcomings in the legal framework. 
The research methodology of this study is doctrinal, desktop-based research. Thus, this will 
encompass international law, international treaties and conventions, maritime law, foreign case 
law, academic journal articles, as well as web newspaper articles. These sources will be 
examined and used to provide a critical analysis of the laws regulating the safety and security 
risks faced by irregular migrants on their journeys across the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
1.4 Architecture of the Dissertation 
This introductory chapter, Chapter 1, will set the scene for the research that will follow. It starts 
off with an outline of the rationale for the study, the objectives, research questions, parameters 
and research methodology. This chapter also provides a history and background to the study 
and goes on to discuss the concept of irregular migration at sea. 
Chapter 2 will consider the ‘Mediterranean Migration Crisis of 2015’. The chapter will begin 
with an account of a family that attempted to cross the Mediterranean Sea in September 2015. 
Following this account, the factors that led to the crisis and the death toll will be discussed. 
Having discussed the start of the irregular migration problem, a discussion of more recent 
incidents will be made to show that this is still a problem today. A statistical analysis will be 
undertaken to prove that there are risks associated with irregular migration and these risks have 
resulted in significant loss of life.  
A discussion of all the safety and security risks faced on the journey across the Mediterranean 
Sea will then be done. The security risks that will be discussed are: abuse and exploitation by 
smugglers and state officials, human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, being 
detained, tortured, and lastly being subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The 
safety risks that will be discussed are: ocean perils, unseaworthy and overcrowded vessels, 
safety of life, interception operations, ‘refoulement’ or being ‘pushed back’, rescue operations, 
and lastly disembarkation in a place of safety once rescued. Another account of an irregular 
migrant will be discussed to sum up the deadly risks involved in irregular migration. 
Having discussed all the safety and security risks associated with irregular migration across the 
Mediterranean Sea, Chapter 3 will examine the international legal framework that is in place 
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to protect irregular migrants from all these risks. Security risks such as migrant smuggling and 
human trafficking will be discussed and defined using international law conventions and 
protocols, along with international human rights law and international refugee law. Various 
maritime treaties will be identified as the main sources of protection from the safety risks faced 
by irregular migrants, together with international refugee law and the principle of ‘non-
refoulement’. Each safety and security risk will be linked to a law or laws and the wording of 
the law will be discussed and elaborated on. This will show the protection available to irregular 
migrants. 
Chapter 4 is linked directly to Chapter 3, as it exposes the gaps and shortcomings in the 
international legal framework. The chapter will begin by looking at each safety and security 
risk and the gaps and shortcomings in the international legal framework that deals with these 
risks. The gaps and shortcomings will be discussed in detail to show that irregular migrants are 
not adequately protected by the safety and security regulatory measures in place.  
Apart from the gaps and shortcomings in the legal framework, the chapter briefly discusses 
that irregular migrants are viewed in a negative light and this has resulted in lack of protection 
and remedies that are available to them. States view irregular migrants as a threat to their border 
security and thus tend to interdict irregular migrants at sea and return them to third countries 
or back to where they came from. This is known as ‘refoulement’ and is a major problem that 
opens irregular migrants up to various risks, including death. Thus, States offer scant protection 
and remedies to irregular migrants by failing to incorporate and implement existing legal 
standards and protections. 
Chapter 5 will conclude by providing an overview of the preceding chapters and summing up 
the findings of the entire dissertation. The findings will then be used to provide 
recommendations on how to address the protection gaps and shortcomings in the legal 
framework and protect irregular migrants at sea.  
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1.5 Background and History 
The Mediterranean Sea has always been the epicentre of migration from several countries 
including North Africa and Libya. Historically, sea-borne travel was known for the risks that 
were attributed to it and as a result, was undertaken only as a necessity.1 Today, due to conflict 
in countries, such as Syria, travelling by sea to Europe is almost always the only means of 
escape for millions of refugees and migrants. However, these voyages come with its share of 
risks and unfortunately for migrants, quite often end in death. To paint this picture, in March 
2014, a group of Syrians attempted to flee conflict by heading to Greece.2 Of the fifteen on 
board the tiny fibreglass vessel to Greece, one was a little girl, barely just four years old.3  
However, not long after departure, the vessel took on stormy seas and rapidly began to sink.4 
Around eight people on board drowned as a result, one of whom was the little girl.5 
 
Map of the Mediterranean Sea and Bordering Countries 
 
Source: http://www.yourchildlearns.com/online-atlas/mediterranean-map.htm  
                                                          
1 D Wagner ‘A Push to the Sea: A Global Analysis of Immigration by the Sea: A United States Coast Guard Policy 
Expansion in Preparation for an Influx of Migrants Via the Sea’ (2015) 14(2) Loyola Maritime Law Journal 304. 
2 Wagner at 303. See also H Smith ‘Seven Syrian Migrants Drown off of Greek Coast’ The Guardian 19 March 
2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/syrian-migrantsdrown-greece, accessed on 
20 August 2018. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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Images of ghastly deaths along the Mediterranean Sea route, like the little girl, expose the risks 
of irregular migration and leaves us all with an unbearable feeling of despair.6 ‘Irregular 
migration’ at sea, also known as ‘boat migration’, is not new.7 ‘Boat migration’ has a long 
history, starting with the Vietnamese ‘boat people’ around the 1970s, Cubans and Haitians 
along the Caribbean Sea since the 1980s and Albanians travelling via the Adriatic Sea in the 
1990s.8 Following this, there was also a series of movements in the 2000s, that included Sub-
Saharan Africans passing along the Strait of Sicily, Iraqis passing through the Aegean Sea and 
of course, the fairly recent migration of Syrians attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea.9  
 
1.6 Definition of ‘Irregular Migration’ 
Various definitions of the term ‘irregular migration’ exist throughout the world. I will first 
discuss the United Nations definition of ‘migrant’ before examining a few of the definitions of 
‘irregular migration’ that exist in some of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. 
Before the term ‘irregular migrant’ is discussed, the term ‘migrant’ itself should be made clear. 
‘Migrant’ is defined by the United Nations as “an individual who has resided in a foreign 
country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the 
means, regular or irregular, used to migrate”.10 This definition encompasses refugees, asylum-
seekers and economic migrants.11 Each of these will be defined below, after having examined 
various definitions of ‘irregular migration’.  
 In Germany, irregular migration is defined as “unlawful entry” and irregular migrants as 
foreigners no longer “possessing a necessary residence title and a right of residence” and are 
therefore “required to leave the territory”.12 The Netherlands legally defines irregular migration 
as “the presence in the Netherlands of foreign nationals who are not in possession of a valid 
residence permit and are therefore obliged to leave the country”.13 French legislators define 
irregular migration as “penetrating or working without conforming with the law” and “staying 
                                                          
6 G Sanchez ‘Critical Perspectives on Clandestine Migration Facilitation: An Overview of Migrant Smuggling 
Research’ (2017) 5(1) Journal on Migration & Human Security 9. 
7 V Moreno-Lax The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (mal)practice in Europe and Australia Policy 
Brief 4 (2017) 1. 
8 Moreno-Lax (2017) at 2. 
9 Ibid. 
10 V Metcalfe-Hough The migration crisis? Facts, challenges and possible solutions (2015) 3, available at 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9913.pdf, accessed on 1 
December 2018. 
11 Ibid. 
12 F Düvell ‘Paths into Irregularity: The Legal and Political Construction of Irregular Migration’ (2011) 13 
European Journal of Migration & Law 279. 
13 Ibid. 
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on the territory of France for a duration not authorized by a visa”.14 Italy, similarly to France, 
defines irregular migration as “foreigners in an irregular position”.15 Thus, there is no 
unanimous definition of ‘unlawful’, ‘irregular’, ‘illegal’ or ‘clandestine’ migration, instead, 
every EU state has its very own legislation and varying definition therein.16  
While the former part of the difficulty is related to the definition of irregular migration, which 
often differs by country, the latter part lies in the wide-ranging nature of an ‘irregular’ status.17 
This latter part can result, for instance, from people entering countries undetected via 
smuggling as well as from minor administrative issues that essentially render a person 
irregular.18 Thus, ‘irregular migration’ is often based on a mix of references to the crossing of 
borders illegally, no residence permits, irregular stay, no work permits, obligations to leave the 
country or violations of removal orders from the country.19 Definitions also tend to either 
conflate entry with stay, such as in Austria and the United Kingdom, or to conflate regular with 
irregular migrants, as in Germany and the Netherlands.20 Consequently, irregular migration 
includes a range of people who are in an irregular situation for different reasons, and people 
can also shift from being regular to irregular, or vice versa.21  
McAuliffe and Mence state that ‘irregular migrants’ can be separated into five different 
categories: (i) migrants who illegally entered a country by either presenting false papers or 
physically evading formal immigration control; (ii) migrants who legally entered a country for 
a time period which has expired, did not renew their permission to stay, and are therefore 
unlawful overstayers; (iii) migrants who are lawfully entitled to stay in a country but are in 
breach of some visa condition, for example, working more hours than their status permits; (iv) 
asylum seekers who legally entered the country to claim refugee status, but remain despite a 
final decision refusing them the right to remain; and lastly (v) children born in a country to 
these ‘irregular migrants’, who also lack a right to remain although they are not themselves 
migrants.22 For the purposes of this study, however, ‘irregular migrant’ will refer only to (i). 
                                                          
14 F Düvell (2011) at 279-280. 
15 F Düvell (2011) at 282. 
16 F Düvell (2011) at 285. 
17 M McAuliffe & V Mence ‘Irregular maritime migration as a global phenomenon’ in M McAuliffe & K Koser 
A Long Way to Go: Irregular Migration Patterns, Processes, Drivers and Decision-making (2017) 21. 
18 Ibid. 
19 F Düvell (2011) at 286. 
20 Ibid. 
21 M McAuliffe & V Mence (2017) 20. 
22 M McAuliffe & V Mence (2017) 21. 
7 
 
Having discussed irregular migration, it is important to now discuss and differentiate between 
refugees, asylum-seekers and economic migrants. A refugee is defined as a person who has a 
“well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.23 
An asylum-seeker is defined as “a person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm 
in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status 
under relevant international and national instruments”.24 In the case of an adverse decision, the 
person may be expelled from the country, unless they are granted permission to stay on 
humanitarian or other related grounds.25 Last, those people that are not forced to escape their 
country because of persecution, but rather choose to leave for the economic benefits in the 
destination country, such as better job prospects, would be labelled as economic migrants.26 
There is a growing trend towards what is now known as “mixed migration flows”, when 
refugees are travelling amongst population flows that consist of both “forced” and “voluntary” 
movements.27 Forced movements refer to refugees and asylum-seekers who are forced to 
migrate due to persecution in their countries, whilst voluntary movements refer to economic 
migrants that leave their home countries voluntarily, to seek better opportunities and escape 
poverty. The focus in this study will be on refugees and asylum-seekers who are forced to 
migrate due to their circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature on 28 July1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 137. 
24 V Metcalfe-Hough The migration crisis? Facts, challenges and possible solutions (2015) 3, available at 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9913.pdf, accessed on 1 
December 2018. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Wagner at 305-306. 
27 B Miltner ‘Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and Interception’ (2006) 30 
Fordham International Law Journal 75. 
8 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
IRREGULAR MIGRATION BY SEA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter One, a background and history of migration at sea was provided. Following this, 
the reasons for the focus on the Mediterranean Sea region and the temporal scope of this 
dissertation were elaborated on. ‘Irregular migration’ and the term ‘irregular migrant’ were 
then discussed, narrowing the scope of the research in this dissertation further. Having provided 
a background into irregular migration, this chapter will begin by examining the ‘Mediterranean 
Migration Crisis’ of 2015 and will then discuss recent incidents in the Mediterranean Sea. A 
discussion of what these incidents reveal will take place through an analysis of statistics and 
graphs. This chapter will then move on to the risks and threats faced by irregular migrants on 
the sea-leg of their voyage. The risks will be analysed in terms of security risks and safety risks 
faced by irregular migrants. In conclusion, an assessment of what pertinent issues arise from 
these safety and security risks will be made. 
 
2.2 The ‘Mediterranean Migration Crisis’ of 2015 
On the day of his death, 3-year-old Aylan Kurdi wore sneakers and a red shirt with blue 
shorts.28 Father, Abdullah and mother, Rihanna, along with their children Aylan, three and 
Galip, five, boarded a dinghy from Turkey in order to escape conflict.29 The Kurdi family paid 
a significant sum of 4 000 Euros because the smugglers had promised a yacht for the trip from 
Turkey to Greece, however, showed up with a 15-foot rubber dinghy.30 Abdullah was aware of 
people who had died on similar journeys across the Mediterranean Sea and was cautious.31 On 
                                                          
28 S B Ray ‘Saving Lives’ (2017) 58 Boston College Law Review 1227. Note: “Aylan” has also been spelt as 
“Alan” in some sources, however, the spelling “Aylan” was chosen here because it is closest to the pronunciation 
of the name in its original language. Similarly, the names of Galip, Rihanna and Abdullah differ in spelling in 
different newspaper articles. 
29 Ibid. See also A Barnard ‘Remembering Alan Kurdi: Syrian Family’s Tragedy Goes Beyond Image of Boy on 
Beach’ New York Times 27 December 2015, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/world/middleeast/syria-refugees-alan-aylan-kurdi.html?smid=pl-share, 
accessed on 13 August 2018. 
30 A Barnard & K Shoumali ‘Image of Drowned Syrian, Aylan Kurdi, 3, Brings Migrant Crisis Into Focus’ New 
York Times 3 September 2015, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/syria-boy-
drowning.html, accessed on 13 August 2018. 
31 S B Ray (2017) at 1227. 
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2 September 2015, the Kurdi family set sail on what was known as one of the “safest” routes 
through the Mediterranean Sea, sadly, only Abdullah survived the journey.32  
Abdullah Kurdi used to be a humble barber from Syria.33 However, life in Syria proved 
impossible when the family increasingly found themselves being persecuted as a result of the 
war.34 The family decided to escape the conflict by relocating several times, to Kobani and then 
Turkey, but life in those countries also proved too dangerous.35 Eventually, Abdullah came up 
with a plan to join his sister and her family in Canada.36 His plan was to borrow money to pay 
for a boat from Bodrum, Turkey to Greece, where once him and his family received refugee 
status, they could travel to Canada.37 However, when the family set off for Greece, the sea was 
too rough for the dinghy, realising this the smuggler decided to abandon the boat.38 Despite 
Abdullah’s efforts to man the dinghy, the waves proved too wild, capsizing the boat, and his 
family along with it.39 The family tried to hold on to Abdullah, who clung to the boat, begging 
his sons not to let go of him; but despite his arduous efforts, the sea claimed the lives of his 
wife and then his sons, one by one.40 The next day, Aylan's body was found on a Turkish beach, 
his cheek lay on the sand as if he were sleeping, except for the waves washing over him.41 He 
was still wearing his red shirt, blue shorts and sneakers.42  
The image of little lifeless Aylan Kurdi made headlines the world over, alerting the world to a 
crisis that had been advancing for years.43 In the end it was not the magnitude of people forced 
to abandon everything they ever knew, but this single tragedy that clarified it all.44 However, 
by the time Aylan’s story was told, more than 300 000 irregular migrants had already risked 
                                                          
32 S B Ray (2017) at 1227. See also G Rayner ‘Aylan and Galip Kurdi: Everything we know about drowned Syrian 
refugee boys’ The Telegraph 3 September 2015, available at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11841802/eu-migrant-crisis-refugee-boys-aylan-galip-
kurdi.html, accessed on 13 August 2018. 
33 S B Ray (2017) at 1227. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. See also Y Steinbuch ‘Photo of drowned toddler causes outcry over migrant crisis’ New York Post 2 
September 2015, available at https://nypost.com/2015/09/02/photo-of-drowned-toddler-causes-outcry-over-
migrant-crisis/, accessed on 13 August 2018.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 S B Ray (2017) at 1227-1228. 
41 A Barnard & K Shoumali at 1. 
42 S B Ray (2017) at 1228. 
43 A Barnard & K Shoumali at 1.  
44 Ibid. 
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their lives trying to reach Europe since the start of 2015 alone, and over 2 600 had perished in 
the attempt.45 Manderson aptly remarks that: 
 
‘We are invited to feel a shudder of sublime horror at this fate, but we are never brought close 
enough to see faces, or engage with individual stories. This specificity might change our 
relationship to these images, and more to the point we might be brought from a generalised pity 
of the circumstances of these refugees, to anger at the injustice of our own policies. While 
barbed wire enclosures, like the open ocean, are treated as the law of nature, and asylum seekers 
as something like wild animals at the mercy of those laws, what we are really invited to 
experience is our own feelings and our own moral virtue.’46 
 
As the above quote suggests, by reading about Abdullah Kurdi and his family, and looking at 
the image of little Aylan’s lifeless body; it is an illustration of the risks of irregular migration 
and also illustrates the gaps in our laws and policies. Although parents can be criticised for 
putting their children in boats, poet Warsan Shire aptly acknowledges that “no one puts their 
children in a boat unless the boat is safer than the land”.47 In an interview responding to Aylan’s 
death, Nicola Sturgeon, the first minister of Scotland soberly stated: “his is not an isolated 
tragedy. He and thousands like him whose lives are at risk is not somebody else’s 
responsibility; they are the responsibility of all of us.”48 From the quotes above and the account 
of Abdullah Kurdi, there is a need for effective policies and laws that deal with irregular 
migrants and offer better protection to them so that more incidents like Abdullah’s can be 
prevented.  
While irregular migrants have been dying in the Mediterranean Sea since the 1990’s, border 
deaths were only labelled a ‘crisis’ in 2015, when there was an unprecedented increase in the 
                                                          
45 W Spindler ‘2015: The year of Europe's refugee crisis’ UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency 8 December 2015, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-
crisis.html?query=the%20mediterranean%20migration%252%E2%80%A6, accessed on 20 August 2018. 
46 D Manderson ‘Not Drowning, Waving: Images, History, and the Representation of Asylum Seekers’ in M 
Dickie, D Gozdecka, & S Reich (Eds) Unintended Consequences: The impact of migration law and policy (2016) 
163-164, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1rqc9ds.10, accessed on 13 August 2018. 
47 J Jeandesboza & P Pallister-Wilkins ‘Crisis, Routine, Consolidation: The Politics of the Mediterranean 
Migration Crisis’ 2016 Mediterranean Politics 1. 
48 I Tharoor ‘Death of drowned Syrian toddler Aylan Kurdi jolts world leaders’ The Washington Post 3 September 
2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/03/image-of-drowned-syrian-
toddler-aylan-kurdi-jolts-world-leaders/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6f1d8dd40916, accessed on 15 August 
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number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea.49 The fairly low migrant mortality rate 
prior to 1990 may be due to the fact that it was much easier to reach Europe, even without any 
authorisation, through ‘regular’ paths.50 Many countries began introducing carrier sanctions 
and stricter visa requirements which has led to a change in transportation for migrants from 
‘regular’, for example airplanes, to ‘irregular’ transportation used today, such as rubber boats.51  
In 2011, illegal border-crossings in the European Union began to spike when thousands of 
Tunisians arrived at the Italian island of Lampedusa, due to the onset of the ‘Arab Spring’.52 
The Mediterranean migration ‘crisis’ is the culmination of the growing restriction of legal 
channels for regular migration due to Europe’s securitisation of borders and large-scale war in 
the Middle East, Syria and certain African countries, causing millions to leave their homes and 
desperately seek asylum in Europe.53 Due to the recent increase in political upheaval and wars 
in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, the surge of migrants attempting to flee conflict are 
largely Syrian, Afghan, and Eritrean.54  
Gruijters and Steinhilper argue that Europe’s strategy of securitisation and shutting of its 
borders is the key factor in the increase in border deaths, as migrants are forced to undertake 
clandestine journeys across the Mediterranean Sea, due to the lack of legal and safe paths.55 
The rise in irregular migration across the Mediterranean Sea, often in extremely overcrowded 
boats or dinghies, has inevitably led to a substantial increase in the loss of life.56 To illustrate 
this point, an incident occurred on 18 April 2015 in Libyan waters, around 180 kilometres from 
Italy's Lampedusa Island, where more than 600 migrants drowned in the Mediterranean Sea 
when their boat overturned and eventually sank.57 A subsequent Maltese and Italian rescue 
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51 Ibid. 
52 J Park ‘Europe’s Migration Crisis’ Council on Foreign Relations 23 September 2015, available at 
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(2016) 29(4) Journal of Refugee Studies 570. 
54 J Park ‘Europe’s Migration Crisis’ Council on Foreign Relations 23 September 2015, available at 
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available at http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-
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operation only managed to save around 50 of the estimated 700 people on board.58 Thus, the 
public’s perception of a serious humanitarian crisis was strengthened by a number of large-
scale deaths in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015.59 
 
2.3 The Mediterranean Sea Today 
Irregular migration across the Mediterranean Sea has been an on-going problem for the 
European Union, one that is apparent in newspaper headlines from 2015 to date. A recent 
incident occurred on 31 March 2018 when the Italian Rescue Maritime Coordination Centre 
(IMRCC) alerted the Libyan Coast guard and a search and rescue ship named the Aquarius, 
that a dinghy had cited distress in the high seas.60 The Aquarius was operated by a technical 
crew, medical staff from Doctors Without Borders (known by its French acronym MSF), a 
nautical crew and rescue workers from the SOS Mediteranee.61 629 people were rescued from 
the Mediterranean Sea by the Aquarius, however, upon arriving in Italy, it was forced to wait 
at port, having been denied the right to berth by Italy and then Malta.62 Matteo Salvini, leader 
of the far-right League and the new interior minister, announced the decision to deny the ship 
disembarkation in Italy, after his demand that Malta take in the ship instead, was turned down.63 
Mr Salvini stated: “From today even Italy is starting to say NO to human trafficking, NO to the 
business of illegal immigration. My goal is to ensure a serene life for these kids in Africa and 
our children in Italy”.64  
Over 500 of the 629 migrants were transferred to two of Italy’s navy and coastguard boats.65 
Inclusive of the 629 people, were eleven children, 123 unaccompanied minors and seven 
                                                          
58 W Spindler ‘2015: The year of Europe's refugee crisis’ UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency 8 December 2015, 
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59 R J Gruijters & E Steinhilper (2018) at 516. 
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pregnant women.66 Those on board were mostly sub-Saharan Africans who had departed from 
Libya and were found in six different rescue operations around the Libyan coast; this was 
inclusive of hundreds who were rescued from drowning by the Italian navy and then moved 
onto the Aquarius.67 After it was denied the right to port by Italy and then Malta, the Aquarius 
was then forced to undertake a 1 500 kilometre or 810 nautical mile voyage to reach Spain.68 
The ship was forced to head to Spain because it was offered safe harbour in the port of Valencia, 
despite apprehensive MSF officials, who stated that: “disembarking at the closest port was 
preferable to a journey of an extra four days”.69  
Apart from the Aquarius, in June 2018 Italy’s new interior minister Matteo Salvini also turned 
away Germany’s vessel Lifeline, which had around 234 migrants on board.70 Salvini has now 
blocked all search and rescue and charity-run vessels from docking in Italy.71 Additionally, 
Italy has handed over responsibility to Libyan coast guard forces to intercept and rescue Libyan 
migrants found in the Mediterranean Sea and return them to Libya.72 Sadly, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency, acknowledged Libya’s announcement 
of its vast search and rescue (SAR) area.73 Italy also has the support of EU heads of state for 
transferring responsibility of SAR operations to Libyan coast guard forces, even in 
international waters, despite the limited capacity of these forces and the well-known fate of 
those who are returned to Libya.74 Sunderland commented that the EU’s actions of blocking 
rescues and indecisiveness on where those rescued should disembark, driven by Italy’s 
draconian approach to migrants, is leading to an increase in deaths and further suffering in 
Libya.75 In responding to the Mediterranean Migration Crisis, the Director General of the 
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International Organisation for Migration pointed out that: “the time is now, and we are already 
late.”76 
 
2.4 Migrant Deaths in the Mediterranean Sea: A Statistical Analysis 
It is significant to discuss the number of people whose attempts to cross the Mediterranean Sea 
have ended in death.77 First, this information allows for an examination of the amount of 
migrant deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and second, migrant statistics regarding the place and 
cause of death helps to determine the factors that contribute to these deaths and thus aids the 
prevention of further deaths through apt legal and policy changes.78 Note, however, that these 
are mere estimates of migrant deaths and as such, they consist of only those incidents that are 
widely reported.79 The fact that the bulk of deaths happen in isolated areas and many of these 
are unknown or not reported, means that the resultant figures tend to underestimate the extent 
of migrant fatalities.80 With that said, to calculate the risks involved in migration, the estimated 
number of people who have attempted crossing the Mediterranean Sea together with the 
estimated number of deaths, need to be examined.81  
The statistics and graphs that follow will be presented in chronological order, ranging from 
2014-2016, to pin-point the spike in deaths and attempted crossings. Following this discussion, 
the most recent statistics from 2017 to date will be presented in comparison, to prove that the 
number of attempted crossings and migrant deaths remain high today. Before looking at the 
statistics, however, it should be noted that there are three main routes via the Mediterranean 
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Sea. The Central route is from certain North African countries such as Libya towards Malta 
and Italy, the Western route is from North-West Africa to Spain, and the Eastern route is from 
Turkey to Greece.82  
The deadliest route, the Central Mediterranean route, shows that in 2014 the ratio of migrant 
deaths to crossings was 1 in 50 and this ratio decreased slightly to 1 in 53 for 2015.83 However, 
from January 2016, 1 in every 23 migrants had died attempting the voyage across the Central 
Mediterranean, clearly showing a significant increase in the death toll.84 The ratio of deaths per 
attempted crossing in 2016 was more than double 2015, from 0.18% of crossings in 2015 to 
0.43% in 2016.85 The ratio of deaths per attempted crossings deteriorated further in April and 
May 2016 when 1 person died for every 17 attempted crossings.86 Figure 1 below shows the 
monthly disappearances and deaths on each Mediterranean route. It is evident that the death 
rate in the Central Mediterranean route occurs at excessively high levels to the number of 
people who were attempting the crossing, especially in comparison to other routes.87  
Figure 1: Migrant deaths in the Mediterranean by route, January 2014 –May 201688 
Source: Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC): Data Briefing Series 
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In the Mediterranean Sea from 2014 to May 2016, 9 492 individuals were estimated dead or 
missing.89 Within these overall figures, over 20 incidents, occurring along the Central 
Mediterranean route, gave rise to more than 100 deaths each, which totalled 6 406 people.90 
Overloading of vessels are predicted to be the main contributory factor to the deaths, even more 
so than rough seas, with large shipwrecks claiming more than half of the lives in the 
Mediterranean Sea.91 The increase in numbers and in the ratio of deaths to attempted crossings 
on the central route are accompanied by a recent increase in migrant arrivals.92 Figures that 
arrived using the Central Mediterranean route dropped to 153 842 in 2015, whereas 847 930 
people were estimated to have used the Eastern Mediterranean route to arrive in Greece.93 
However, geographic factors and different routes do not provide an explanation for the 
variations in the risk of crossing over the years.94 Although this variation in risk may be 
partially due to random fluctuation,  smugglers are also likely to be a factor; for instance, it is 
believed that the increased death toll in 2016 along the Central Mediterranean was interlinked 
with the rise of a militia-led smuggling syndicate in Libya, that cruelly disregarded the safety 
of migrants when carrying out their operations and strategies.95 
Thus, migration has become riskier and resulted in drastic loss of life since 2014. This, 
however, must be examined in comparison to the most recent Mediterranean Sea statistics. 
Between the start of January and end of June 2018, over 48 300 migrants and refugees departed 
from Turkey and North Africa and crossed the Mediterranean Sea.96 25% of those who arrived 
in 2018 were children, 59% men and 16% women.97 It is estimated that nearly 1 288 people 
have died between January and June 2018 as a result of the risks associated with crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea mentioned above, however, this is in contrast with 2 300 deaths in the same 
period in 2017.98 June 2018 registered the worst fatalities for those crossing the Central 
Mediterranean, with around 564 people estimated dead at sea, which is 1 death for every 7 
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people.99 73% of deaths took place along the Central Mediterranean route from North Africa 
to Italy, however, the 302 deaths that occurred along the Western route is far higher in 
comparison to the 57 deaths in the same period in 2017.100 Figure 2 below shows the estimated 
fatality rate in the Mediterranean Sea, with 1.6% in 2017 and 1.5% in 2018. This demonstrates 
that migration is still an on-going problem leading to dire loss of life at sea today. 
Source: Missing Migrants Project 
Statistics also show that although in the past, most irregular migrants were men, whereas today 
many women and children are making these perilous journeys.102 Although the EU have 
acknowledged the risks associated with women migrating and have called for increased action 
to prevent violence against women, recent migration and asylum strategies are forcing them 
into irregular migration, wherein they are at greater risk.103 Freedman has also highlighted the 
difficulties and impediments associated with women migrating, such as responsibility for their 
children, scarce economic resources, restrictions within their country and other countries on 
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women travelling alone, and uncertainties regarding violence on the journey.104 The increase 
in female migrants who are risking the voyage across the Mediterranean to reach Europe could 
be attributable to the worsening circumstances in Syria, and for Syrian refugees in Turkey, 
accompanied by the harsh realisation that the conflict is unlikely to end soon.105 Thus, it is clear 
that women do not migrate unless they have no other choice and do so as a last resort.106 The 
fact that there is an increase in the number of female migrants aptly encapsulates the 
desperation that is at the root of irregular migration. 
 
2.5 Risks Faced by Irregular Migrants in the Mediterranean Sea 
The following account of Louay Khalid illustrates the deadly risks that irregular migrants face 
at sea. Having paid 1 300 Libyan dinars to be smuggled to Europe, Louay Khalid was 
eventually crammed onto a heavily overloaded vessel with around 500 other migrants, some of 
whom were steering it.107 There were people stuffed into every space on the boat, including the 
engine room and on the mast.108 Before long, the vessel was approached by police circling 
around and demanding the vessel stop its voyage, however, the vessel did not cease; shots were 
then fired and police started to “round” the vessel, tossing ropes to jam the engine fan in an 
attempt to stop the boat.109 Parents were now holding their children close and others on board 
were crying and panicking, but the gunfire sustained until the cabin gave way; during this 
chaos, two of the pregnant women gave birth.110  
The next day, after a four hour wait, an airplane arrived following one of the migrant’s distress 
call to the Red Cross.111 However, the passengers all shifted to one side of the boat in a 
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desperate attempt to attract the plane’s attention, and it capsized as a result.112 Sadly, most of 
the passengers had already drowned when the plane circled back later with life buoys; Luckily, 
Louay had on a lifejacket which managed to save his life.113 At long last, two speedboats came 
to rescue the women and children and a helicopter was sent to hand out life jackets.114 The 
meagre forty survivors, were also given floats but were then forced to wait a further day and 
night to be taken to Malta.115  
On 15 April 2015, around 400 migrants died after their vessel capsized and just five days later, 
a further 700 migrants drowned in a second capsizing in Libyan waters.116 These two 
devastating events lead to a swift European response to the Mediterranean crisis and within 
days, EU leaders called an emergency meeting of the European Council.117 The result was a 
series of commitments to reinforce the EU’s response to the ‘migration crisis’; the largest 
initiatives included creating new resettlement programs to reduce the strain on Italy and 
Greece’s asylum processes and resources; immensely increasing the budgets for operations 
‘Triton’ and ‘Poseidon Sea’; and lastly initiating a military operation to “disrupt criminal 
smuggling networks” and “destroy smugglers’ vessels”.118 However, academics and human 
rights advocates criticized the Frontex and anti-smuggling operations for focusing on 
militarized border control measures, rather than on the humanitarian obligations to rescue those 
in distress and to identify those eligible for international protection.119 
Thus, it is clear from the aforementioned that irregular migrants who attempt to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea face a plethora of risks.120 Being intercepted by State authorities, such as 
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coast guards and border patrol guards, is a fairly common risk.121 As irregular migrants, being 
found by these State authorities at sea often results in being subjected to violence, rape and/or 
abuse, thrown overboard by smugglers who are afraid of being arrested, being detained or even 
worse, “pushed back”, which involves being escorted out of the State’s jurisdiction and 
deprived of a chance to claim asylum.122 In addition to the aforementioned, irregular migrants 
are forced to deal with problematic travelling conditions and as a result, many migrants never 
reach Europe.123 Thus, Lutterbeck acknowledges that threats to migrants’ safety and security 
during their voyage to Europe derive from two main sources, as noted above: (i) harsh, perilous 
weather and travel conditions and (ii) ill-treatment by both smugglers and State authorities.124 
The security risks faced by irregular migrants will now be discussed in detail and examples of 
the risks mentioned above will be provided. Following this discussion, the same will be done 
to explain the safety risks faced by irregular migrants on the sea-leg of their voyage. 
 
2.5.1 Security Risks 
Abuse of migrants by smugglers, much like smuggling itself, is wide-spread and has become a 
norm in the Mediterranean Sea.125 The relationship between migrants and their smugglers is an 
unusual one because although the migrants are “customers” of the smugglers and pay for their 
“services”, migrants are also unlike “ordinary customers”, as they are extremely vulnerable.126 
This is due to the fact that migrants more often than not have no knowledge about the country 
they are travelling through; this, coupled with their ‘irregular’ status and sheer desperation, 
means that they are more prone to abuse and exploitation by smugglers.127 Freedman states that 
some European leaders erroneously believe that the existence of smuggling gangs are the main 
reason for spike in numbers of migrants that are attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea.128 
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However, she goes on to argue that these smugglers are only gaining more work because the 
safe and ‘regular’ passages into Europe are increasingly blocked, forcing migrants to pay 
smuggler’s more money and for them to undertake more perilous journeys in order to reach 
Europe.129 
Lutterbeck points out that in offering their ‘services’ smugglers tend to conceal the risks and 
dangers of crossing the Mediterranean Sea, promising that the trip will be short and 
unproblematic.130 Furthermore, smugglers often lie to migrants by stating that they will provide 
a large vessel for the journey, and sometimes show pictures of a large boat as proof, but the 
harsh reality is a small and unseaworthy vessel, to say the least.131 Freedman relays the account 
of a Syrian family, along with their two small children, who were reassured of their journey in 
a proper fibreglass vessel and as a result, were happy to pay 1 000 dollars for this; to their 
dismay they were loaded onto a three metre rubber boat with fourteen others.132 She goes on to 
add that to make matters worse, shortly after their departure, the boat’s motor ceased and it 
proceeded to float aimlessly for nine hours until finally, the Greek coastguard came to the 
rescue.133 
It is clear from first-hand accounts of migrants, that smugglers have no respect for human life; 
this is clear because if and when they can, they do not hesitate to risk the lives of migrants in 
order to make a profit.134 Many first-hand accounts of migrants prove that it is common to be 
sold, like mere commodities, either by smugglers to the police or vice versa.135 In an interview 
with Lutterbeck, one migrant confessed that a smuggler who was smuggling him and a few 
others from Sudan to the Libyan city of Ajdabiya, sold them to the Libyan police and they were 
all detained until they offered up payment in exchange for their release from prison.136 Several 
other interviews done by Lutterbeck also show that migrants themselves were sometimes 
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integrated into the smuggling processes by being asked to serve as middlemen and offered to 
steer the boats in return for a free crossing.137 
Migrants are also, more often than not, exploited and manipulated by smugglers during their 
journeys.138 To illustrate this, Lutterbeck states that despite having agreed to transport migrants 
directly to Tripoli, smugglers sometimes drop migrants off in another coastal town, in the 
clutches of another smuggler, demanding more money to complete the voyage to Tripoli.139 
Similarly, in 2017 there were a number of reports of migrants being wronged and also detained 
by smugglers, in order to obtain more money than was previously agreed upon.140 Several 
families who were interviewed also protested that their smugglers had offloaded their 
belongings into the sea and explaining it by saying that “there was no room in the boat” or 
because they thought the “boat might sink” with the extra weight.141  
In 2017 countless migrants reported being victims of abuse by smugglers, traffickers or armed 
forces whilst travelling towards Europe.142 Sadly, many of those who had departed from Libya 
and were headed to Europe were detained for months on end, kept in inhumane conditions, 
tortured for ransom, repeatedly sexually violated or forced into modern slavery.143 Women and 
underage girls often fall prey to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) when trying to cross 
the Mediterranean Sea, and 2017 was no exception.144 The risk of SGBV on the way to Greece 
was high, more so for women travelling by themselves and children who were travelling 
alone.145 Despite the fact that SGBV is often not reported, there were reports in excess of 300 
SGBV incidents that showed a high degree of sexual assault, rape and human trafficking.146 
The bulk of women and girls travelling to Italy in 2017 were believed to have faced major risks 
of SGBV and as a result, there were a number of reports of incidents among them, however, 
the reports also included incidents where adult males and underage boys were also victims.147   
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2.5.2    Safety Risks 
As previously mentioned, irregular migrants have been forced to transit new routes over the 
years, often meaning longer journeys and more dangerous encounters.148 The different types of 
vessels used also plays a crucial role in the risk faced. For example, there is a high risk of 
suffocating for migrants being held in sealed containers on cargo ships; similarly, the lives of 
migrants that are forced into propeller bays or engine masts, are in danger because of the 
machinery as well as suffocation.149 Being at sea carries a wide range of risks, some that are 
inherent in seaborne transportation, and others that are more specific to smuggling of irregular 
migrants.150 The risks of sea-borne travel are generally rough seas, unstable weather patterns 
and poor visibility, however, for irregular migrants these travel risks are much more hazardous 
than for the average seafarer.151  
Boats carrying irregular migrants are at a greater risk of losing direction, as explained below, 
and of running out of food supplies or water, this is owed to the fact that smugglers ensure that 
all the extra space on their boat is set aside for more migrants, at the expense of everything 
else, including fuel.152 The boats are generally run by inexperienced “captains” who double as 
smugglers, with little to no navigation equipment, resulting in the likelihood of getting lost at 
sea being high.153 These boats are also substandard because smugglers choose not to invest in 
their upkeep, with the knowledge that the increase in maritime surveillance means that the 
boats are likely to get confiscated by State authorities if found.154 Furthermore, an 
inexperienced captain and crew coupled with the boat’s unseaworthiness, are all reasons why 
unforeseen leaks and motor problems are frequent occurrences; there is also a heightened risk 
of capsizing due to overloading of the vessel, as is more often the case than not.155 
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Being lost at sea has its fair share of risks all in its own. For instance, boats heading from West 
Africa towards the Canary Islands can miss their mark and end up on the Atlantic instead.156 
When boats run out of fuel they can float helplessly for weeks, leading to a slow death for 
migrants resulting from either starvation, dehydration, sun stroke or hypothermia.157 Rescue 
operations are also much more dangerous to take on in bad weather, as it is difficult to transfer 
migrants from one vessel to the other without injury.158 In addition to bad weather, overloading 
of migrant boats coupled with poor stewardship, makes rescuing migrants aboard tricky.159 
Instead of being rescued, however, irregular migrants are more likely to be the target of 
interceptions, which are even riskier than rescues because border patrol personnel are generally 
not trained to perform rescue operations and lack the rescue equipment.160 To make matters 
worse, some irregular migrants are afraid of State officials and also cannot swim, adding to 
their panic and inevitably to some rescue and interception operations ending with lives lost.161 
As aforementioned in this chapter, disputes between States over where rescue and 
disembarkation responsibilities lie, often means that migrants are at risk of their distress calls 
going unanswered or ignored and consequently not being rescued.162 When found in 
interception operations, instead of being rescued, boats carrying migrants are “pushed back” to 
international waters or to a different coast; this is common between Italy and Libya today.163 
Being “pushed back” means that migrants are often subjected to prolonged exposure that could 
lead to death because the chances of running out of food, water and fuel, and getting lost at sea, 
are high.164 Commercial vessels sometimes turn away from migrant boats in distress because 
of the risks and financial losses, but more often than not because of fear that their assistance 
could result in being arrested for “assisting” or “facilitating” smuggling of migrants.165 
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Although there is a legal obligation to recue people at sea, recently, this legal duty to rescue 
has been undermined and discouraged by a number of regulations, laws, policies and practices 
that have come about on international, national and even regional levels and that seems to be 
increasing.166 Although rescue at sea is a legal obligation on seafarers and is anchored in 
international and national law, it has unfortunately been undermined and made to target 
irregular migrants, through recent legal sanctions.167 Most of these laws that effectively 
discourage the duty to rescue at sea are the result of failed attempts to prevent, criminalise and 
penalize those who are involved in smuggling, assistance and facilitation.168 These laws and 
policies have led to the ‘securitisation’ of rescue, and as a result, has weakened the international 
rescue regime as a whole, as well as international obligations to rescue at sea, in particular.169  
 
2.6    Conclusion 
It is quite clear from this chapter that irregular migration remains a major problem in the world 
today. It has been shown that irregular migrants are dying in the Mediterranean Sea, trying to 
traverse the waters, often fleeing conflict and with no other choice. This is made clear by the 
fact that most irregular migrants originate from war-torn countries and are forced to either flee 
the conflict or do nothing and die. Despite news coverage far and wide, that highlight the risks 
and fatalities associated with irregular migration today, migrants continue to make these 
dangerous journeys across the sea. Whilst the numbers may have risen in 2015, the rate of death 
today is still alarmingly high. Statistics prove that there is a high risk of death across the 
Mediterranean Sea and the number of migrants attempting to cross the sea has not decreased, 
despite this fact.  
It is almost impossible to get across the Mediterranean Sea unscathed as safety and security 
risks faced by irregular migrants are so immense, that it begs one to question why these 
journeys are undertaken at all. The answer to that question is clearly, because migrants have 
no other option but to put their lives at risk, with a glimmer of hope of a better life and asylum 
in Europe. This chapter identified and discussed in detail, the main safety and security risks 
faced by irregular migrants on the sea-leg of their voyage across the Mediterranean Sea. To 
summarise, the security risks faced are: abuse and exploitation by smugglers and state officials, 
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human trafficking, forced labour, sexual and gender-based violence, being detained, torture, 
and lastly being subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The safety risks faced 
by irregular migrants are: ocean perils, unseaworthy and overcrowded vessels, safety of life, 
interception operations, being “pushed back” to transit countries, rescue operations, and lastly 
disembarkation in a place of safety once rescued. 
A holistic assessment of this chapter also shows that irregular migration is still a major problem 
and requires us to look at the existing legal framework. Thus, the following chapter, Chapter 
Three, will set out, as well as critically analyse, the current international legal framework that 
seeks to protect irregular migrants from the safety and security risks faced during their voyage 
in the Mediterranean Sea.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two identified the safety and security risks faced by irregular migrants on the sea-leg 
of their voyage across the Mediterranean. To recap, the security risks that were identified are: 
abuse and exploitation by smugglers and state officials, human trafficking, sexual and gender-
based violence, being detained, tortured, and lastly being subjected to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment. The safety risks faced by irregular migrants are: ocean perils, 
unseaworthy and overcrowded vessels, safety of life, interception operations, ‘refoulement’ or 
being ‘pushed back’, rescue operations, and lastly disembarkation in a place of safety once 
rescued.  
This chapter will set out the international legal framework that protects irregular migrants from 
these safety and security risks faced during their voyage across the Mediterranean Sea. The 
reason for the focus on international law, treaty law and maritime law, is because most of the 
safety and security risks occur at sea and are faced by irregular migrants who come from 
different countries all over the world. Thus, although European laws and policies are mentioned 
briefly, a discussion of Europe’s regional and domestic laws as well as European policies, is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. This chapter will begin by examining the security risks and 
the laws that apply to them and then move on to the safety risks.  
 
3.2 Security Risks 
3.2.1 Migrant Smuggling 
During the 1990s, as trafficking increased, the United Nations Crime Commission agreed that 
there was a need to develop a treaty on ‘trafficking of migrants’, following which there was a 
keen interest towards developing one for ‘smuggling’ as well.170 Thus, the UN decided on two 
instruments: one that dealt with the movement of people into exploitation (human trafficking) 
and one that dealt with facilitation of illegal movement of migrants (migrant smuggling).171 
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These two instruments were adopted in 2000 and have since come to be known as the Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air172 and the Protocol against Trafficking 
in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing their parent instrument, the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.173 
The term ‘smuggling of migrants’ was coined fairly recently and before being detached by its 
own definition, this term was often incorrectly and interchangeably used with ‘migrant 
trafficking’ when referring to facilitating a migrant’s illegal entry into a country.174 The 
Smuggling Protocol defines ‘smuggling of migrants’ in Article 3(a) as “the procurement, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry 
of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.” 
Thus, migrant smuggling is underway if a wrongdoer obtains the “illegal entry” of another, 
who is not a “national or permanent resident” into a State Party, and this is done with the 
intention of gaining a “financial or other material benefit”.175 Article 6 of the Smuggling 
Protocol adds that State Parties are required to criminalise smuggling and smuggling-related 
“production and possession of fraudulent travel or identity documents” and enabling of illegal 
stay when committed with the intention of gaining a “financial or other material benefit”.176  
In 2016, Gallagher led a study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, examining 
how closely States had kept to the Smuggling Protocol’s definition of ‘migrant smuggling’ in 
their national law, more specifically the ‘benefit’ element of it.177 None of the 13 States 
                                                          
172 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly under 
Resolution 55/25 on 15 November 2000 and entered into force on 28 January 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Smuggling Protocol). 
173 A Gallagher (2017) at 2. See also United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(hereinafter referred to as UNTOC or the Organized Crime Convention), along with the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (hereinafter referred to as the 
Trafficking Protocol). The Convention and its Protocols, targeting specific areas of organized crime, were adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000. The Convention entered into 
force on 29 September 2003 and the Trafficking Protocol on 25 December 2003. 
174 A Gallagher (2017) at 1. 
175 A Gallagher (2017) at 2. 
176 Ibid. See also Article 6(1) of the Smuggling Protocol which states “Each State Party shall adopt such legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally and in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit: (a) The smuggling of migrants; (b) 
When committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of migrants: (i) Producing a fraudulent travel or 
identity document; (ii) Procuring, providing or possessing such a document; (c) Enabling a person who is not a 
national or a permanent resident to remain in the State concerned without complying with the necessary 
requirements for legally remaining in the State by the means mentioned in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph or 
any other illegal means”. 
177 A Gallagher (2017) at 3. “The study examined national legislation and case law and interviewed 122 
practitioners from 13 States.” The 13 states surveyed were: “Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, 
Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.”   
29 
 
surveyed, had stuck to the exact definition in the Smuggling Protocol’s when enacting their 
domestic law.178 The EU Council Directive 2002/90/EC is one such example.179 Article 1(a) 
defines the facilitation of unauthorised entry as “any person who intentionally assists a person 
who is not a national of a Member State to enter, or transit across, the territory of a Member 
State in breach of the laws of the State concerned on the entry or transit of aliens”. It is evident 
that the ‘benefit’ element is excluded from the above definition.180 However, the EU added in 
Article 1(2), that reads: 
 
‘Any Member State may decide not to impose sanctions with regard to the behaviour defined 
in paragraph 1(a) by applying its national law and practice for cases where the aim of the 
behaviour is to provide humanitarian assistance to the person concerned.’ 
 
Article 1(2) grants the EU the choice of excluding individuals facilitating illegal entry for 
humanitarian purposes from persecution.181 This is clearly a stricter definition of smuggling 
than described in the Smuggling Protocol, as the burden of proof now rests on those who allege 
that their actions were undertaken for humanitarian or altruistic reasons.182 In addition to this, 
the use of the wording “may decide” means that each and every European Union Member State 
is granted a discretion to either prosecute those who claim that their actions are for 
humanitarian reasons or not, as they see fit.183 
Although the Smuggling Protocol necessitates criminalising smuggling and related conduct 
and cooperation in preventing and combating smuggling, these obligations are subject to a 
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number of caveats and limitations.184 Article 5 prohibits State Parties from prosecuting 
migrants for the fact that they have been smuggled by stating “migrants shall not become liable 
to criminal prosecution under this Protocol for the fact of having been the object of conduct set 
forth in article 6 of this Protocol.”185 As the Smuggling Protocol’s drafters so aptly exclaim: 
“smuggled migrants are victims and should therefore not be criminalized.”186 The Smuggling 
Protocol, in fact, encourages states in Articles 6(3)(a) and (b) to “adopt legislative and other 
measures” to protect the smuggled migrant in circumstances where smuggling has “endangered 
or is likely to endanger the life or safety” of that migrant, or in circumstances that entail 
“inhuman or degrading treatment” of the smuggled migrant.187  
Protecting migrants’ rights is recognized as one of the three aims of the Smuggling Protocol, 
and thus, State Parties are clearly obligated to do everything in their power under international 
law to ensure that the rights of smuggled migrants are protected and upheld.188 This is reiterated 
by Article 16, which protects many migrant rights, such as the right not to be subject to torture 
or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to life; and the right 
to consular access.189 State Parties are also required to protect migrants against smuggling 
related violence and offer them appropriate assistance if their “lives or safety are endangered” 
through the smuggling process.190  
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The Smuggling Protocol includes a very specific Savings Clause in Article 19(1) which states: 
 
‘Nothing in this Protocol shall affect the other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States 
and individuals under international law, including international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law and, in particular, where applicable, the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the principle of non-refoulement as 
contained therein.’ 
 
The Savings Clause is significant as it provides protection to all migrants, specifically 
mentioning that humanitarian law, human rights law and the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ 
will apply and shall not be affected by any of the provisions in the Smuggling Protocol.191 This 
will be discussed as the chapter progresses. 
 
3.2.2 Human Trafficking 
The Trafficking Protocol has proved to be a game-changer, triggering unprecedented levels of 
action nationally and especially internationally.192 States very quickly began to incorporate its 
core provisions into their national laws and today, ‘trafficking’ is criminalised in just about 
every country.193 Most national anti-trafficking legislation contain comprehensive provisions 
on victim protection and support that go beyond the minimum standards and obligations set 
out in the Trafficking Protocol.194 This trend has been influenced by international and regional 
laws and policies that uphold the central tenets of the Trafficking Protocol in addition to 
expanding its human rights provisions.195 The protection offered to irregular migrants in the 
Trafficking Protocol can be seen by the definition of ‘trafficking in persons’ in Article 3(a), 
which states: 
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‘The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose 
of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.’ 
 
From this definition it is evident that the Trafficking Protocol provides protection to those who 
are trafficked, including protection against threats and exploitation. Although Article 3(a) 
above does not define the term ‘exploitation’, it does list different forms of exploitation, such 
as forced labour or services, sexual exploitation and so on.196 Furthermore, “at a minimum” is 
used as a catch-all phrase, meaning that the list is not exhaustive and ensuring that new or 
alternate forms of exploitation are not excluded.197 However, it must be noted that some forms 
of ‘exploitation’ that are present during migrant smuggling, does not also constitute human 
trafficking. For instance, in cases involving the inhuman or degrading treatment of smuggled 
migrants, such as those mentioned in Chapter 2, the fact that there is an element of 
‘exploitation’ does not change the act of smuggling into trafficking.198 
While smugglers and traffickers both prey on the vulnerabilities of people in search for better 
lives, the UNHCR has separated the two by conceding that “victims of trafficking are 
distinguished from migrants who have been smuggled by the protracted nature of the 
exploitation they endure, which includes serious and ongoing abuses of their human rights at 
the hands of traffickers.”199 This means that the relationship between migrant and smuggler 
generally stops when the migrant has reached their destination, however, for a trafficked person 
the destination is just the start of a journey of abuse.200 This is in line with academic literature, 
where the majority view is echoed by Gjerdingen, who asserts that cases that are classified as 
‘smuggling’ are often not as exploitative or severe as opposed to those classified as 
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‘trafficking’.201 Hathaway aligns with Gjerdingen stating that while smuggled migrants are 
prone to abuse, this is surpassed by the amount of abuse that occurs in trafficking cases.202  
Baer claims that the Trafficking Protocol comprises 3 subsections of trafficking regulations, 
aptly labelled the “3-P Index”, and they are recognized globally as a starting point in drafting 
anti-trafficking legislation.203 First is the ‘prosecution’ of trafficking offenders, second is the 
‘protection’ of victims of trafficking and third, is the ‘prevention’ of any future offences.204 
First, the prosecution of trafficking crimes is a crucial component and is dealt with in Article 
5(1) of the Trafficking Protocol, which states: “each State Party shall adopt such legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth 
in article 3 of this Protocol, when committed intentionally.” Article 5(2) also explicitly 
condemns traffickers, accomplices, and anyone organizing or directing other persons to commit 
an offence.205  
Second, the protection of victims is also an integral part of any anti-trafficking legislation.206 
Article 6 addresses the rights of victims to privacy and confidentiality, victim protection, any 
help needed to testify against their traffickers, information regarding court proceedings, 
information on their legal rights and counselling, housing, employment and educational 
prospects and medical support.207 Critics, such as Gallagher, have argued that this section lays 
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out a general framework for individual state legislation, but it does not specifically oblige states 
involved because they are merely required to provide assistance to victims “in appropriate cases 
and to the extent possible under its domestic law”.208 
Third, and often considered the most important factor when seeking to attack and combat 
human trafficking, is prevention.209 As is identified by the Trafficking Protocol under Article 
9(1)(b): “States Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other 
measures: (b) To protect victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, from 
revictimization.” The re-trafficking of victims is a major problem in many areas as victims 
often have no other place to turn for a job than back to their traffickers.210 Many NGOs and 
humanitarian organizations, such as the Red Cross, supplement the Trafficking Protocol by 
both prosecuting traffickers to the full extent of the domestic laws in place, as well as providing 
assistance to rescued victims and offering protection from being re-trafficked.211 
 
3.2.3 International Human Rights and Refugee Law 
Apart from the protections offered in the two Protocols, several international treaties and 
conventions also protect irregular migrants’ basic human rights. One such instrument is the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights212 which protects the right to life;213 the 
right not to be subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment;214 the right 
not be held in slavery or forced labour;215 and the right not to be arbitrarily detained or arrested, 
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to name a few.216 Similar provisions can also be found in the regional laws of the EU, such as 
the European Convention of Human Rights217 under Article 2, the right to life, Article 3, 
prohibition of torture and Article 4, prohibition of slavery and forced labour. Lastly, the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,218 as its name suggests, provides a definition of torture and protection against all 
forms of torture.219  
Apart from the international human rights laws mentioned above, international refugee law 
also provides protection to irregular migrants. A state may decide who may enter and remain 
in its territory, however, this aspect of state sovereignty is contrasted with the body of 
international law concerned with the rights and protection of refugees, i.e. international refugee 
law.220 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees reflect certain customary international law rules, which requires 
compliance even by States that are not a party to the above instruments.221 The first important 
rule that now forms part of international customary law, is that refugees should not be punished 
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for entering another state illegally.222 This is enshrined in Article 31(1) of the Refugee 
Convention, which states: 
 
‘The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, 
on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in 
the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they 
present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry 
or presence.’ 
 
This Article essentially prohibits the penalisation of refugees for unauthorised entry or 
presence, as long as they have arrived directly from countries where their lives were 
“threatened” and show “good cause” for violating the immigration laws.223 Article 31(1) is 
significant as it is in line with the Smuggling Protocol, and as will be shown, other international 
laws not to penalise irregular migrants for the fact that they have entered a country illegally. 
The second significant rule that can be found in Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention, 
codifies the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ and is considered to be the cornerstone of 
international refugee protection.224 ‘Non-refoulement’ requires States to avoid sending 
refugees back to their persecutors and is now complemented by ‘non-refoulement’ obligations 
in international human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and CAT, as well as regional human 
rights instruments such as the ECHR.225 This principle will be discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
3.3  Safety risks 
3.3.1 The Duty to Rescue 
The duty to rescue people at sea is a fundamental rule of international maritime law and is 
incorporated in international treaties, in addition to constituting a norm of customary 
international law.226 Under international human rights law, the duty to rescue people claiming 
                                                          
222 Brolan (2002) at 563. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ratcovich at 108. See also Miltner (2006) at 97-99. 
226 I Papanicolopulu ‘The duty to rescue at sea, in peacetime and in war: A general overview’ (2016) 98(2) 
International Review of the Red Cross 491. See also R L J Kilpatrick & A Smith ‘The International Legal 
37 
 
distress at sea forms part of every States’ positive duty to protect the lives of the people within 
their jurisdiction.227 In maritime law, the duty to save life at sea can be found in Article 98 of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea228 which goes on to state that: 
 
‘1.  Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without         
serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: 
a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; 
b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of 
their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him; 
… 
2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an 
adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, 
where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with 
neighbouring States for this purpose.’ 
 
The above duty contains two separate obligations; the duty incumbent on flag States to oblige 
masters to rescue people at sea, and also the duty of coastal States to start-up and maintain 
search and rescue operations.229 Dealing with the first obligation, it should be noted that the 
territorial range of the duty on masters to assist those citing distress, extends to every maritime 
zone.230 Thus, while Article 98 of UNCLOS is a part of Part VII, the High Seas, it applies 
equally to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), resulting from of the cross-reference in Article 
58(2).231  Similarly, for the territorial sea the duty to rescue can be inferred by the use of the 
word “assistance” in the case of danger or distress, as stated in Article 18(2).232  
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The second duty combined in Article 98 above necessitates coastal States establishing and 
operating effective search and rescue services.233 Since UNCLOS does not define “search and 
rescue services”, this is clarified by several international maritime law treaties, such as the 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea234, the International Convention on Salvage235 and the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue.236 The SAR Convention orders State 
Parties to distribute and allot areas where they have search and rescue jurisdiction, and these 
designated areas at sea are now known as “SAR regions”.237 Additionally, State Parties are 
directed to launch ‘Rescue Coordination Centres’ (RCC’s) to handle initial medical services, 
monitor distress signals and communicate with public and private vessels, including private 
airplanes and commercial vessels.238  
The SAR Convention defines the terms ‘search’ and ‘rescue’. ‘Search’ is defined as “an 
operation, normally co-ordinated by a rescue coordination centre or rescue sub-centre, using 
available personnel and facilities to locate persons in distress”, while ‘rescue’ is “an operation 
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to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them 
to a place of safety”.239 SAR also states in Chapter 2.1.10 that “parties shall ensure that 
assistance be provided to any person in distress at sea. They shall do so regardless of the 
nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found”. This 
means whether people are associated with any illegal actions or not, should not influence the 
duty to rescue them in any way; this is also in line with the customary law rule not to penalise 
refugees for their unauthorised entry, found in Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention, as 
discussed in 3.2.3 above.240 
One of the main problems with the duty to provide search and rescue services is centred around 
disembarkation of those who have been rescued. As discussed in Chapter 2, States have 
disagreed on where to disembark those rescued, thus resulting in delays that are unnecessary 
and at times life-threatening.241 Consequently, because of frequent incidents of non-compliance 
and disagreement over where to disembark, the SAR and SOLAS Conventions were amended 
in an attempt to clarify this issue.242 The amendments state that “the State responsible for the 
SAR region in which such assistance is rendered” must now “exercise primary responsibility” 
to make certain that the States involved co-ordinate and co-operate so that survivors are 
disembarked and then “delivered to a place of safety”.243 At a close reading of the 2004 
amendments in SAR and SOLAS, however, the fundamental question of which State should 
disembark those rescued, remains unanswered and while SAR obliges seafarers to retrieve 
persons in distress and deliver them to a “place of safety”, this is not defined or clarified in the 
SAR or SOLAS conventions.244 These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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3.3.2 The ‘Non-Refoulement’ Principle 
The ‘non-refoulement’ principle is recognized as a binding EU obligation.245 As previously 
mentioned, the principle is enshrined in Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention. Article 33(1) 
states: “no Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.” This ‘non-refoulement’ obligation means that States are required to give rescued 
migrants who have possible refugee claims the opportunity to establish these asylum claims.246 
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention outlines a refugee to be a person who:  
 
‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country.’ 
 
This definition is the foundation of the Refugee Convention, however, having been enacted 
over 65 years ago, the current problems faced were not what the legislators had in mind at that 
time and unfortunately, this reflects in the failure of the Refugee Convention to protect a large 
chunk of those in need of international protection today.247 Sadly, today asylum-seekers are 
only recognized as refugees if their claims are linked to the exhaustive list in the definition.248 
Considering the above and to ensure the effectiveness of the ‘non-refoulement’ obligation, 
Ratcovich infers that the ‘non-refoulement’ principle should also be applied to those who have 
not formally been recognised as ‘refugees’ and to those with a presumptive or prima facie claim 
to refugee status, namely, asylum-seekers.249  
When irregular migrants are intercepted at sea, which will be discussed in the next point, it 
may involve being ‘pushed back’ into international waters and so it is relevant to consider if 
the ‘non-refoulement’ obligation entails ‘screening’ to determine the status of asylum-seekers 
before such ‘push-backs’ occur.250 Logically, since the obligation prohibits a state from 
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returning ‘refugees’ and the only way to determine who is a refugee is through refugee status 
determination, this is included in the obligation.251 Accordingly, in situations where the return 
of the asylum-seekers would leave them with no other choice but to return home (de facto 
refoulement), or to a third country where they would be sent back home (‘chain’ or ‘indirect’ 
refoulement), there is an obligation to first determine refugee status.252  
 
3.3.3 Maritime Interception 
There are terms that are often used interchangeably with ‘interception’, such as ‘push-backs’, 
‘non-admission’, ‘interdiction’ and ‘non-entrée’, however, this chapter will refer only to the 
word ‘interception’, as its definition is all encompassing of the terms listed above.253 There are 
various meanings of the term ‘interception’ in international law, however, the focus in this 
chapter will be on intercepting vessels that carry irregular migrants at sea and preventing them 
from entering their destination country.254 This type of ‘physical’ interception involves 
boarding a vessel to inspect, confiscate, or destroy it and also includes ‘push-backs’, in which 
intercepted vessels are forced back either to another coast or the high seas, in an effort to 
prevent those on board from disembarking in a specific State.255  
Though irregular migrants who manage to reach a State are still at risk of  being deported 
through immigration proceedings, these proceedings are often quite lengthy and the results are 
uncertain.256 Therefore, States are motivated to prevent irregular migrants’ arrivals in the first 
place.257 Aside from the fact that the Refugee Convention is silent about its extraterritorial 
reach, Moreno-Lax concludes that there is general consensus that ‘refouler’ means to drive 
back or repel, which does not take for granted a presence in-country.258 This supports the view 
that ‘non-refoulement’ includes rejection in transit or ‘excised’ zones, at the border, and 
anywhere at sea.259 As mentioned, interception can take different forms such as confiscating, 
boarding and ‘pushing back’ a vessel, which includes handing asylum-seekers over to other 
States.260 If the effect of the measure is to prevent migrants from reaching the borders of a 
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State, thus exposing them to serious harm, then the ‘non-refoulement’ obligation applies, 
preventing States from ‘pushing back’ irregular migrants.261 
Despite the various names and forms of interception, the most famous definition is by the 
Executive Committee (ExCom) of UNHCR when they issued a Conclusion in 2003, that 
defines interception as: 
 
‘One of the measures employed by States to: 
(i) prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey; 
(ii) prevent further onward international travel by persons who have commenced their 
journey; or 
(iii) assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is 
transporting persons contrary to international or national maritime law;  
where, in relation to the above, the person or persons do not have the required documentation 
or valid permission to enter; and that such measures also serve to protect the lives and security 
of the traveling public as well as persons being smuggled or transported in an irregular 
manner.’262 
 
It is evident from the ExCom definition that interception encompasses a wide range of 
activities, including intercepting boats at sea when there is a suspicion of migrant smuggling, 
which will be discussed below. The ExCom definition of interception is so wide, however, that 
it distorts the line between interception and rescue by asserting that interception also serves to 
“protect the lives and security” of irregular migrants.263 However, interception, unlike rescue, 
is motivated principally by securitisation and migration control.264 This point is recognized by 
the International Organization for Migration, when it observed that States “which have the 
ability to do so find that intercepting migrants before they reach their territories is one of the 
most effective measures to enforce their domestic migration laws and policies”.265 Portraying  
interception as a ‘humanitarian’ act actually conflates these migration control activities with 
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humanitarian acts of rescue when in reality the two are on opposite ends of the spectrum; this 
problem that will be discussed further in Chapter 4.266  
 
3.3.4 Limitations to Maritime Interception 
Maritime interception is limited by several international laws, one being UNCLOS. UNCLOS 
categorises different zones of water based on their proximity to the coastal state. The territorial 
sea, the contiguous zone, and the high seas will be discussed, as these have differing levels of 
jurisdiction in relation to the control a coastal state has over vessels.267 The territorial sea covers 
12 nautical miles from a State’s coastline and is the zone at sea in which States enjoy the most 
sovereignty.268 As previously mentioned, in territorial waters a State has jurisdiction and is 
obliged by international human rights law to ensure that they protect the lives of those present 
within these waters.269 Under Article 17 of UNCLOS, the territorial sea is where vessels of all 
countries enjoy a right of innocent passage including stopping when deemed necessary due to 
distress or to offer assistance.270  
Article 19 of UNCLOS states that “passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State”.271 Thus, passage may not be considered 
innocent if a vessel loads or offloads people, in direct violation of the immigration laws and 
policies of the coastal State.272 UNCLOS allows States to take ‘necessary steps’ to prevent 
passage that is not innocent273, however, this is limited by Article 27, which does not allow for 
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the arrest or any other form of criminal authority over vessels during passage, with the 
exception of the exhaustive list contained therein.274  
Some authors argue that a vessel is not exactly regarded as “innocent” if it is transporting 
irregular migrants who intend to apply for asylum in the coastal State.275 Pallis supports this 
view by saying that while seeking asylum accords with international law, passage with asylum 
seekers aboard may not be considered “innocent”.276 However, Moreno-Lax convincingly 
asserts that Article 19 should not be applied at all, except if there is physical ‘loading’ or 
‘unloading’ of people and this is in breach of immigration laws.277 She also solidifies her 
arguments by stating that her stance is reinforced by Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention, 
which plainly states that refugees must not be penalised for their unauthorised entry into a 
country and that anti-smuggling/anti-trafficking laws must be interpreted in accordance with, 
and subject to Refugee Law, as stated in the Smuggling and Trafficking Protocols.278  
The contiguous zone follows the territorial sea and covers a further 12 nautical miles beyond 
the territorial sea, where the coastal State enjoys a ‘limited right of police’.279 This area does 
not allow for as much state sovereignty and for most purposes, is akin the high seas.280  Article 
33(1) of UNCLOS, allows the coastal State to exercise only such control as is necessary to 
prevent the infringement of its immigration regulations within its territory or territorial sea, 
which requires proportionality in each case.281 Moreno-Lax argues that contrary to EU Member 
States’ assumptions, exercising the authority to escort migrants to another port, forcibly 
returning them to their countries, or even detention are not included within the meaning of this 
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provision.282 She adds that when exercising jurisdiction in this zone, this exercise of power is 
subject to “other rules of international law”.283  
Lastly, state authorities are not allowed to engage foreign-flagged vessels on the high seas 
without the consent of the flag State, as ships are entitled to freedom of the high seas.284 
UNCLOS only recognises a ‘right of visit’ which allows for warships to board foreign-flagged 
vessels on the high seas, if there is a “reasonable suspicion” that the vessel is “engaged in 
piracy, the slave trade, or unauthorized radio broadcasts”.285 Irregular migrants are known to 
use ships that are not flying a flag, or are ‘flagless’ and in these instances all States enjoy a 
‘right of visit’; which means a right to board the vessel in order to verify its nationality.286 
Whether further powers of ‘arrest’ or ‘interception’ are included within this remains 
contentious, however, most authors agree that these powers are not included, except where 
expressly conferred by treaty, such as the Smuggling Protocol.287  
The Smuggling Protocol allows for “appropriate measures” to be taken where “evidence 
confirming suspicion” of migrant smuggling is found, however, it must be borne in mind that 
these measures must take account of the other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States 
and individuals under international law, including international human rights law, the Refugee 
Convention and the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ as contained therein.288 Thus, it is clear that 
although asylum-seeker boats may be ‘flagless’, this does not grant States infinite powers of 
enforcement or arrest.289 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The discussion of security risks faced by irregular migrants has shown that the Smuggling 
Protocol and Trafficking Protocol were designed specifically to criminalise and prevent 
migrant smuggling and human trafficking. There are protections to victims of smuggling and 
trafficking in both these Protocol’s, however, these protections have not always been 
incorporated into domestic laws in the EU. The international human rights laws also protect to 
irregular migrants’ basic human rights, such as the right not to be subjected to torture. These 
human rights have also been incorporated in the EU in the ECHR. Lastly, international refugee 
law provides protection to irregular migrants by forbidding them from being penalised for 
entering a country illegally. The ‘non-refoulement’ principle also obliges all States, even those 
not a party to the Refugee Convention, to screen for asylum claims when intercepting a vessel 
with possible asylum-seekers and not to simply return these people to a place where they have 
a “well-founded fear of being persecuted”.  
Similar protection is evident in the safety risks discussed, particularly with the duty to rescue 
at sea. This duty is a fundamental part of international law and provides protection to irregular 
migrants by obliging States and master’s to rescue all people in need of assistance. The duty to 
rescue ensures that those irregular migrants who are lost or in need of assistance are taken to a 
place of safety. However, it has been noted that disembarkation at a place of safety is not 
defined in international law. Maritime interception is allowed in certain instances, such as in 
the Smuggling Protocol, however, irregular migrants are protected by all other international 
laws that the Smuggling Protocol is subject to and that seek to limit interception at sea, such as 
UNCLOS and the ‘non-refoulement’ principle. 
Having discussed the protection available to irregular migrants under the international legal 
framework, Chapter 4 will discuss the protection gaps in this framework. A critical analysis of 
the protection gaps and shortcomings that exist in the international legal framework will be 
undertaken. This will be done in order to evaluate if the international legal framework provides 
adequate protection to irregular migrants during their voyage across the Mediterranean Sea. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
PROTECTION GAPS AND SHORTCOMINGS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three discussed the international legal framework that protects irregular migrants from 
the safety and security risks faced on their voyage across the Mediterranean Sea. The 
Smuggling Protocol and the Trafficking Protocol were both identified as the main sources of 
protection from the security risks faced by irregular migrants, along with international human 
rights law and international refugee law. UNCLOS, SAR, SOLAS and the Salvage Convention 
were identified as the main sources of protection from the safety risks faced by irregular 
migrants, together with international refugee law and the principle of ‘non-refoulement’, as 
contained therein. 
Having discussed the international legal framework that provides protection to irregular 
migrants, this chapter will set out the protection gaps and shortcomings that exist therein. This 
chapter will first discuss the protection gaps that exist in the international framework regarding 
the security risks, and then move on to the protection gaps that exist in the international 
framework regarding the safety risks faced by irregular migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. A 
critical analysis of the protection gaps and shortcomings will be done in concluding the chapter, 
to determine if the protection available to irregular migrants under the international legal 
framework is sufficient.  
 
4.2 Security Risks: Protection Gaps in the Legal Framework 
4.2.1 Migrant Smuggling 
In Chapter 3, the Smuggling Protocol and the definition of ‘smuggling of migrants’ were 
discussed. Gallagher argues that the inclusion of the smuggler’s intention “to obtain a financial 
or other material benefit” as an element of the crime of smuggling was specifically added to 
narrow its scope and to exclude humanitarian acts of rescue and those for family reunification 
reasons.290 Gallagher’s view corresponds with that of Basaran, who submits that the ‘benefit’ 
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element, as alluded to above, is crucial to the definition of smuggling.291 He also asserts that 
humanitarian and/or other similar acts lack this crucial element and so even if they enable the 
irregular entry of migrants, they do not fall under the definition of ‘migrant smuggling’ in the 
Smuggling Protocol.292 In the official records of the proceedings, drafters of the Smuggling 
Protocol also affirmed that: “It was not the intention of the Protocol to criminalize the activities 
of family members or support groups such as religious or non-governmental organizations”.293  
However, UNTOC and its provisions apply when interpreting the Protocols and thus must be 
read together with the Smuggling Protocol.294 Article 34(3) of UNTOC provides that “each 
State Party may adopt more strict or severe measures than those provided for by this 
Convention for preventing and combating transnational organized crime”. This means that 
State Parties are free to create offences that are stricter and as a result require less onerous 
elements than the smuggler’s ‘intention’, such as recklessness or negligence.295 This has led to 
problems as many domestic laws, especially in the EU, have become so strict that they 
essentially criminalise: (i) humanitarian acts of rescuing migrants and (ii) migrants for having 
been smuggled. The laws and practices relating to (i) and (ii) will be elaborated on below. 
In practice, the ‘benefit’ element has been misrepresented by criminals in court proceedings, 
claiming that their acts of migrant smuggling were not done for any benefit.296 Consequently, 
a public prosecutor is saddled with proving intention or some arrangement of payment between 
the parties, in order to meet this element; proving that there was a ‘benefit’ is almost impossible 
to establish because it is invisible and proof of its existence is extremely hard to find.297 It is 
for this reason that many States have chosen not to include the element of ‘benefit’ in their 
domestic laws, a perfect example of which is the EU in their Council Directive 2002/90/EC. 
The directive evidences a gap in the protection of irregular migrants by criminalising 
                                                          
291 Basaran at 381. 
292 Ibid. 
293 A Gallagher (2017) at 2 and 3. See also Basaran at 381-382. Quotations adopted from the text of the United 
Nations General Assembly, Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation 
of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto 
(A/55/383/Add.1), para 88. 
294 Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Smuggling Protocol state: “This Protocol supplements the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It shall be interpreted together with the Convention” and 
“The provisions of the Convention shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Protocol unless otherwise provided 
herein”. 
295 Hartati at 29. 
296 Aljehani at 128. 
297 Ibid. 
49 
 
humanitarian acts of rescue, thus dissuading rescue, resulting in irregular migrants being left 
to their fates at sea.  
Migrants and seafarers’ testimonies at the Strait of Sicily confirm that there is a propensity to 
turn away from irregular migrant vessels and avoid rescuing them, so as to avoid costly 
investigations, arrest or detention.298 Though all the defendants were eventually acquitted, the 
case of Cap Anamur299 compellingly illustrates how anti-smuggling laws have transformed 
humanitarian rescue efforts into a sanctioned enterprise.300 The case was against three members 
of an organisation called Cap Anamur, a humanitarian organization created in 1979 to assist 
boat people.301 On 20 June 2004 the German-flagged Cap Anamur, owned by the eponymous 
organisation, discovered a rubber dinghy with 37 African men in distress between Libya and 
Italy, claiming to be fleeing the crisis in Darfur, Sudan or Sierra Leone.302 Three days later the 
Cap Anamur rescued another migrant boat with eleven people on board in Maltese territorial 
waters and escorted them to the nearest Maltese port; the first rescued group did not disembark 
as they wished to apply for asylum in Germany.303  
Cap Anamur heads towards Sicily, Italy but is denied permission to dock at the port.304 Italy 
stated that the vessel had passed through Malta and those rescued should apply for asylum 
there; Germany also agreed with this view.305 After a twelve day wait, Cap Anamur cites 
distress on the vessel and proceeds to the port, where police rapidly identified the men rescued 
as Nigerians and Ghanaians, and not Sudanese.306 The captain, director and first officer were 
arrested for assisting irregular migration upon their arrival, and their vessel seized as well.307 
In November 2006, two years after their arrest, their trial began and continued for another three 
years.308 The prosecution insisted on a fine of €400 000 for each person and four years in prison 
for “assisting irregular entry” under the aggravated circumstances clause contained in Italian 
Legislation 286/1998, however, as mentioned the parties were acquitted of all charges.309 The 
case demonstrates that there is a fine line between acts that are “for-profit” and “non-profit” 
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and as a result, between criminals and humanitarians.310 Holistically it has been shown that 
there is a level of conflict in the ‘benefit’ element under the definition of smuggling of 
migrants.311 While this element is a necessity so as to exclude humanitarian acts of rescuing 
migrants or rescuing them because of close family ties, smugglers are also able to abuse the 
‘benefit’ element to escape being held criminally liable for their actions.312 
It is clearly stated several times in the Smuggling Protocol that migrants’ rights should be 
protected, however, many states have failed in implementing these protections into their 
domestic laws. The wording in the Savings Clause makes it clear that if any State Party, in 
applying the Smuggling Protocol, fails to act in accordance with international law, as well as 
international refugee law, they are in stark violation of one of the Protocol’s fundamental 
provisions.313 Gallagher remarks that:  
 
‘Very few States would be able to defend their actions against migrant smuggling as 
conforming to the letter and spirit of the Protocol with regard to smuggled persons rights under 
that instrument including their right to consular access; to assistance; and to protection from 
inhuman or degrading treatment.’314  
 
What must be emphasised is that along with smugglers, refugees who are in need of asylum 
are also present on unseaworthy boats, and are forced to deal with so-called ‘criminals’, simply 
because smugglers seem to offer the only passage to their asylum.315 Brolan argues that because 
refugees and economic migrants end up consorting with the ‘criminal’, the public tend to 
conflate all three of the above and so, sadly, refugees, economic migrants, and migrant 
smugglers become assimilated.316 The fallout is that States exploit this public fear by 
stereotyping refugees as a burden and danger to the public, a social “threat” and of course 
economically motivated.317 Thus, States emphasise the connection between smuggled migrants 
and transnational organized crime in order to characterise migrants as a “threat” to the public 
                                                          
310 Basaran at 375. 
311 Aljehani at 128. 
312 Ibid. 
313 A Gallagher (2017) at 4. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Brolan (2002) at 594. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid. 
51 
 
and the State’s security; this justifies the State’s measures against irregular migrants, including 
externalisation of border controls and militarisation of migration management, which would 
normally come across as extreme.318  
Frontex is an EU border management agency, amongst various other roles. The agency defines 
risk as “a function of threat, vulnerability and impact”, or “the likelihood of a threat occurring 
at the external borders, given the measures in place at the borders and within the EU, which 
will impact EU internal security and/or the security of the external borders”.319 Here, the border 
is described as “vulnerable” while irregular migrants crossing it are defined as a “threat”.320 
Furthermore, separation of the term ‘smuggling’ from ‘trafficking’ has had the effect of 
influencing the public that migrant smuggling is a crime against the State and irregular 
migrants, complicit in this crime and therefore do not deserve protection.321 While international 
rules acknowledge the exploitation of migrants and the need to protect their rights, these have 
not changed the entrenched perceptions of irregular migrants.322 Accordingly, the protections 
that should be available to smuggled migrants are seldom incorporated and enforced through 
national laws and practices, resulting in a significant gap in irregular migrants’ protection.323 
While there are problems with the Smuggling Protocol, the Trafficking Protocol has proven 
itself to be a game-changer, as mentioned. A well-resourced, dynamic anti-trafficking 
‘industry’ ensures that how State’s choose to respond to trafficking is scrutinised and there is 
persistent and intense pressure on States to keep their laws and policies in line with 
international standards; the same, however, cannot be said for the anti-smuggling ‘industry’.324 
In comparing the Protocols, while the Smuggling Protocol has attracted substantial ratification, 
the response to it could not have been more different.325 The Smuggling Protocol has not led 
to or been a model for any further legal development; additionally, there is no anti-smuggling 
‘industry’ or suitably funded organizations that concentrate on what States are doing about 
smuggling and holding them accountable for their actions.326 As a result, in implementing their 
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legislative and policy responses, States have significantly moved away from the central tenets 
of the Smuggling Protocol, leading to a lack of uniformity.327  
It is clear that it is ultimately the discretion of States whether and how closely they wish to 
adhere to the provisions of the Smuggling Protocol and incorporate them into their domestic 
laws.328 It is necessary for States to adhere to the wording of the Smuggling Protocol, because 
this helps create a standardised and uniform approach towards smugglers and migrants, whilst 
also upholding the protections available in international refugee and humanitarian law.329 
However, as has been shown thus far, States have chosen to incorporate only the parts of the 
Smuggling Protocol that best suit them and to ignore the protections granted to irregular 
migrants. Consequently, most EU national laws significantly lack protection to irregular 
migrants, despite EU member states being parties to the Smuggling Protocol. 
 
4.2.2 Human Trafficking  
Although irregular migrants are generally smuggled into a country and not trafficked, they can 
also fall prey to traffickers throughout their journeys.330 Acknowledging this, most women and 
children are so afraid of opening themselves up to the risk of rape and/or sexual abuse that they 
are deterred from using smugglers on their journeys.331 Therefore, smuggling and trafficking 
can be interconnected, as people who willingly seek a smuggler’s assistance to cross a border, 
may also be subject to serious human rights violations in the process.332 However, smuggled 
people are distinguished from trafficked people in that their participation in the illegal entry 
process is voluntary, though they may nevertheless be subjected to exploitation, ill-treatment 
or other violations of their human rights by smugglers.333  
In contrast to trafficking, however, it must be stressed that smuggling involves at least a 
moment in which the migrant ‘consents’ by undertaking a voluntary decision to participate in 
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being smuggled.334 Accordingly, the element of ‘consent’ could be regarded as a default 
element in the definition of ‘smuggling of migrants’ in the Smuggling Protocol, even though it 
is not expressly included therein.335 Apart from the ‘consent’ element, as mentioned in Chapter 
3, the element of ‘exploitation’ also distinguishes trafficking from smuggling. The distinction 
between those who are smuggled and those trafficked is crucial because they are both treated 
in a different way and afforded different protections in the Trafficking and Smuggling 
Protocols.336 Aljehani states that trafficked individuals are entitled to “rights within the scope 
of criminal investigations and proceedings, compensation for damages suffered, temporary or 
permanent residence, accommodation and employment, educational and training 
opportunities”, however,  in contrast, the Smuggling Protocol contains scant rights and 
protections for smuggled migrants.337  
There are many advantages to being classified as ‘trafficked’ and in the same token many 
disadvantages to being deemed ‘smuggled’; therefore, a mix-up between being trafficked or 
smuggled would result in the State applying an inadequate legal framework and the person 
concerned would be offered meagre protection.338 In addition, the Trafficking Protocol imposes 
a greater financial and administrative burden on States and this establishes a strong incentive 
for State authorities to categorize migrants as smuggled instead of trafficked.339 The fact that 
the Smuggling Protocol and the Trafficking Protocol fail to acknowledge the link between 
trafficking and smuggling and address their possible overlap, has led to a significant gap in the 
protection offered to those who are trafficked, as many can be incorrectly identified as 
smuggled migrants.340  
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4.3 Safety Risks: Protection Gaps in the Legal Framework 
4.3.1 The Duty to Rescue 
I. Disembarkation 
One of the core issues with the duty to rescue concerns disembarkation. Although SOLAS and 
SAR govern rescue and rendering of assistance on the high seas, problems arise once seafarers 
render assistance, only to find that the nearest coastal State is refusing to disembark the rescued 
migrants.341 Coastal states allowing smuggled migrants to disembark are saddled with several 
responsibilities such as screening for refugee or asylum-seeker claims.342 Thus, in an attempt 
to avoid this and other onerous financial and legal obligations, such as long-term resettlement, 
some States are reluctant to grant permission to disembark rescued migrants.343  
When coastal States started to refuse disembarkation permission, rescuing vessels and more 
specifically, the commercial shipping industry, were then burdened with this issue.344 This 
created a drain on financial resources and crew members for caring for those rescued, coupled 
with interruptions to commercial shipping schedules because vessels were forced to move from 
port to port, seeking permission to disembark those rescued.345 As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
because of these frequent incidents of non-compliance and disagreements over disembarkation, 
the SOLAS and SAR Conventions were amended to clarify the disembarkation of those 
rescued.346 The 2004 amendments deal with some problems with disembarkation, namely: 
masters of ships are to be released from their obligations with minimum further deviation from 
the ship’s intended voyage and relevant parties are to arrange for disembarkation as soon as 
reasonably practicable.347  
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In addition, the amendments require that “the State responsible for the SAR region in which 
such assistance is rendered” must now “exercise primary responsibility” to make certain that 
the States involved co-ordinate and co-operate so that survivors are disembarked and then 
“delivered to a place of safety”.348 The amendments entered into force in 2006 and now binds 
all State parties, except for Malta which had objected to them.349 While the State responsible 
for the SAR region has “primary responsibility”, this responsibility relates only to “ensuring 
such co-ordination and co-operation occurs”.350 The text is silent about what should be done or 
what happens if no agreement is reached and fails to explicitly impose an obligation on the 
SAR State to disembark if and when no agreement is reached.351 The disembarkation problem 
creates a critical protection gap for refugees rescued at sea by exposing them to serious risks 
of harm on board vessels; in addition, they may be abandoned at sea by those unwilling to risk 
the onerous costs involved in being refused permission to disembark.352  
Disputes over disembarkation have escalated to the point that they have tested relationships 
between States, as was the case in the M/V Pinar E incident.353 The M/V Pinar E, a vessel 
flying the Turkey flag, had rescued around 140 people from the coast of Lampedusa (an Italian 
island), however, this island falls part of Malta’s SAR region; this lead to a deadlock between 
Malta and Italy as to which one of the two should permit disembarkation of the migrants.354 
Malta argued that the migrants should disembark at the nearest port, that being Lampedusa, 
however, Italy countered this argument by stating that because the migrants were rescued 
within Malta’s SAR region, Malta ought to be responsible for their disembarkation.355 In the 
end, Italy chose to accept the migrants only because of ‘humanitarian’ reasons and made sure 
to emphasize that this was an exception should not be regarded as a norm.356 Thus, without a 
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specific treaty that obligates the SAR State to accept disembarkation of those rescued, their 
duty extends only to coordinating of rescue operations.357  
This incident is one of many between Italy and Malta in recent years and these disputes occur 
as result of Malta objecting to the amendments of SAR and SOLAS, in addition to the IMO 
Guidelines.358 These disputes expose a key weakness in the international maritime law 
framework and the consequences are that commercial ships that choose to rescue migrants in 
the Maltese SAR region off Lampedusa, are given contradictory orders by Malta and Italy on 
where to disembark them.359 Malta has stuck to the argument that disembarkation should take 
place at the closest safe port to the rescue, which in Malta’s SAR areas is generally an Italian 
port.360 Legally, both States are not wrong as Italy has accepted the SOLAS and SAR 
amendments and Malta has not.361 The result of this is that two co-operating States are governed 
by two conflicting laws, making a uniform and co-ordinated decision to a shared problem 
impossible.362 
Another disembarkation issue is centred around delivering those rescued to a “place of safety”. 
The 2004 IMO Guidelines were drafted to supplement the SAR Convention, acknowledging 
that SAR does not provide a definition of “place of safety”.363 According to the IMO Guidelines, 
a “place of safety” is: 
 
‘a location where rescue operations are considered to terminate. It is also a place where the 
survivors’ safety of life is no longer threatened and where their basic human needs (such as 
food, shelter and medical needs) can be met. Further, it is a place from which transportation 
arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next or final destination.’364 
 
It is clear from this definition that the rescuer may need to consider the character of the intended 
place of disembarkation and how this is related to the rescued migrants, to determine whether 
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it is indeed a safe place.365 The IMO Guidelines also emphasise that “the need to avoid 
disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded 
fear of persecution would be threatened is a consideration in the case of asylum-seekers and 
refugees recovered at sea”.366 This wording coincides with the ‘non-refoulement’ principle, 
meaning that international refugee law ties into the interpretation of ‘place of safety’.367 
Ratcovich asserts that given the general and open-ended character of ‘place of safety’, the 
parties’ common intention upon conclusion of the 2004 amendments was to give the concept a 
meaning that reflects obligations enshrined in other relevant and applicable rules of 
international law.368 He adds that the ‘non-refoulement’ obligation is an integral aspect of the 
concept of place of safety and that this is supported by references to ‘non-refoulement’ in the 
IMO Guidelines, as discussed above.369 One noteworthy problem with the IMO Guidelines – 
IMO Guidelines are not binding.370 
In light of the above, a smuggled migrant who has been rescued at sea is also entitled to 
disembarkation at a place of safety, pursuant to the disembarkation rules under the SOLAS and 
SAR Conventions, but pursuant to the Smuggling Protocol, is not to be liable to criminal 
prosecution for the fact of having been the object of smuggling.371 Hence, it may not be lawful 
for State Parties to the Smuggling Protocol to disembark smuggled migrants at a ‘place of 
safety’ where their treatment will amount to a penalty or punishment, such as a place where 
they are held in indefinite detention equal to imprisonment.372 As discussed, the Smuggling 
Protocol entitles smuggled migrants to protection from violence that may be inflicted upon 
them for having been smuggled, and to assistance when their lives or safety are endangered.373 
This will be discussed further under 4.3.2 below. 
II. Disincentives of Rescue 
A major problem that adversely affects rescue at sea and may negatively impact the willingness 
of seafarers to actually rescue refugees and migrants, is the possibility of being held criminally 
liable after doing so.374 In some instances, the master and crew who rescued migrants and 
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disembarked them, have subsequently been charged with going against Italian domestic law 
rules regarding aiding irregular migration, as the case of Cap Anamur illustrates.375 Even if 
charges are eventually dropped and the parties are declared innocent, as in the Cap Anamur 
case, bringing charges against them is likely to deter others from rescuing migrants at sea; 
being arrested and then further detained pending the outcome of a trial will almost certainly 
result in loss of wages if not loss of a job.376 As Captain Schmidt of the Cap Anamur states: “if 
seafarers at sea notice a refugee boat, they know, that we stood trial for three years. The 
acquittal does then perhaps not play an important role anymore. The process amounts to 
punishment.”377 
Apart from the possibility of criminal charges, using commercial ships for rescue leads to 
substantial economic loss, during and then subsequent to rescue efforts at sea.378 To name a 
few, there are the costs of fuel, wages and stores as a result of unscheduled navigation, food, 
water and medical supplies for the rescued migrants, port charges when delivering rescued 
migrants to a place of safety, and other substantial indirect losses linked to delays.379 These 
strong commercial disincentives to comply with the duty to rescue prove that some commercial 
vessels may want to avoid these onerous costs and obligations by choosing to turn off electronic 
tracking equipment when near migrant vessels.380 Kilpatrick and Smith have added that there 
have been complaints from surviving migrants who state that vessels intentionally ignored their 
pleas for assistance.381  
III. Enforcement of Rescue Obligations 
Another significant limitation to the duty to rescue is the lack of enforcement.382 This is an 
issue that is created in the case of ships flying under ‘flags of convenience’. While on the high 
seas, vessels are under their flag State’s jurisdiction.383 States used in ‘flags of convenience’ 
have no link to their vessels and are used to reduce costs and curb regulation.384 The problem 
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with ships sailing under ‘flags of convenience’ is that many of these flag States either do not 
possess the drive or the resources to regulate their vessels and because they are unable or 
unwilling to enforce existing standards, any violation of these standards goes unpunished.385  
In addition to the above, international law obligations are sometimes not incorporated into 
domestic laws.386 Incorporation of the duty to rescue is of grave importance as it is generally 
accompanied by sanctions for non-compliance, and given their dissuasive force, lack of 
sanctions will only further encourage seafarers to look away.387 Lack of incorporation into the 
domestic laws of a State also results in lack of competence by their domestic courts and as a 
result, any matters regarding non-compliance with the duty to rescue will not be admissible 
because of the court’s lack of competence to hear these matters.388 Still on the point of lack of 
competence by domestic courts, additionally no competent judicial authority exists to deal with 
such claims; domestic judges may not be competent to hear cases of non-compliance of the 
duty to rescue sea and there is sadly no international judge that can deal with these matters.389  
UNCLOS offers a complex system of “dispute settlement”, but this was drafted to deal mostly 
with inter-State disputes, where a claim for non-compliance is brought by one State, on behalf 
of the migrant, against another State, representing the vessel’s flag State or the coastal State.390 
However, pragmatically, it is improbable that a State will take the chance of threatening its 
relationship with another State only to prosecute a master who has not complied with the duty 
to rescue and as such, there are no known instances of this taking place.391 This is another gap 
in irregular migrants’ protection, as victims of these maritime incidents do not have any tool at 
their disposal to dissuade shipmasters from failing to comply with their duty to rescue.392 
Although migrants can sue seafarers for failing to rescue them, it must be borne in mind, 
especially in the context of the Mediterranean Migration crisis, that litigation sought by 
penniless migrants is highly unlikely.393 These plaintiffs would face several barriers along the 
way; they would first and foremost need to survive, despite not being rescued, then manage to 
identify the vessel that did not rescue them, and finally spend a significant amount of money 
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in suing the master and crew in a court that has jurisdiction over these matters.394 Despite these 
significant barriers, the recent case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy395 demonstrates that 
migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea have actually gone this route and used 
litigation as a means to force compliance with the duty to rescue at sea, however, this case 
should not be viewed as the norm but rather, the exception.396 The case will be discussed further 
below. 
 
4.3.2 Maritime Interception 
As mentioned, it is only the Smuggling Protocol that allows for “appropriate measures” to be 
taken where “evidence confirming suspicion” of migrant smuggling is found, however, these 
measures must take account of the other obligations and responsibilities under international 
law.397 Actions such as confiscating a vessel and arresting and/or detaining all passengers; 
ordering a ship to change its course; escorting a vessel to a third country or handing it over to 
a third State’s officials, were not envisaged by the terms of the applicable treaties in each 
case.398  
Italy’s attempts at creating bilateral agreements and treaties are particularly important, to 
illustrate the above. From the year 2000, Italy began initiating a sequence of agreements with 
Libya regarding irregular migration, which then concluded with the 2008 ‘Treaty of Friendship, 
Partnership and Cooperation’ between then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Colonel 
Muammar Qaddafi.399 In exchange for joint participation between Libya and Italy in 
interception operations that would occur in Libya’s territorial sea, Italy agreed to train Libyan 
officials and provide operational resources, together with general financial support to Libya.400  
The bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya resulted in litigation in the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), in the aforementioned Hirsi case. The case involved Eritrean and 
Somali migrants who were intercepted by the Italian Coast Guard and Revenue Police off the 
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coast of Lampedusa and were handed over to Libyan authorities.401 The migrants objected to 
being returned to Libya throughout the process, and when in court, they alleged that the Italian 
officials did not ask where they were travelling and just confiscated their personal belongings 
and documents of identification.402 Italy argued that it did not have jurisdiction to perform 
asylum-seeker determinations because it was engaged in a “rescue” operation at the time.403 
However, the ECHR rejected this by holding that Italy would not be able to avoid its 
responsibilities to perform refugee status screenings by characterising its “interdiction” 
activities in this way (as rescue operations).404 
The agreement between Italy and Libya was carefully evaluated by the ECHR, taking into 
account international human rights law and other EU obligations as well.405 The court held that 
Italy had failed to comply with its legal obligations under international refugee law by not 
providing refugee screenings for the migrants in order to determine if they were refugees and 
added that Italy could not escape its obligations by choosing to enter into a bilateral agreement 
with Libya, as it had done.406 Furthermore, the court stated that the principle of ‘non-
refoulement’ is a significant obligation of all EU member states and this principle prevented 
those intercepted at sea from being ‘pushed back’ and allowed them instead to request asylum, 
thus Italy was required to screen for asylum-seekers.407 The ECHR ordered Italy to pay 15,000 
Euros to each of the plaintiffs plus court costs. 
The Hirsi case proves that States cannot evade refugee law and human rights requirements by 
stating border control measures such as interception, are actually rescue operations.408 By 
professing an act to be a ‘rescue’ provides a legal basis to interfere with another boat, especially 
on the high seas, where a restricting ‘right of visit’ applies.409 Thus, the amalgamation of the 
remote high seas with ever-increasing State pressure to intercept, makes passing off an 
interception as a ‘rescue’ a more appealing explanation.410 This trend is also gaining popularity 
because of the recent amendments to SOLAS and SAR , that now make sure that masters and 
crews of vessels that have rescued migrants are discharged of further responsibility for them as 
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soon as is possible, which often means after disembarkation.411 Furthermore, a rescue operation 
on the high seas means that disembarkation is coordinated by a RCC, as opposed to interception 
operations on the high seas that does not have any clear responsibilities when it comes to 
disembarkation.412  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
It is clear from the discussion above of security risks faced by irregular migrants that the 
protection gaps lie in lack of incorporation and implementation of international instruments. 
Most of the instruments discussed, such as the Smuggling Protocol and the Trafficking 
Protocol, provide adequate protection to irregular migrants, however, failure to incorporate 
these protections in domestic and regional laws, has resulted in lack of enforcement. State 
parties have begun to include migrants as part of the crime of smuggling in their domestic laws. 
This has led to irregular migrants being targeted as criminals, instead of offered protection as 
victims of smuggling. Humanitarian efforts to rescue migrants are also included and 
criminalised under States’ anti-smuggling laws.413 This has led to sanctioning of rescue that 
seeks to preserve the safety and security of irregular migrants at sea.414 Consequently, there are 
significant gaps in the protection of irregular migrants against the security risks faced in the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
Similar issues are evident in the safety risks discussed, particularly with the duty to rescue and 
disembarkation. The disembarkation of rescued people is generally quite urgent because the 
vessel could be overcrowded and may not have the necessary food and other such supplies to 
house the rescued migrants.415 The confusion that is left by international treaties concerning 
identification of the State that should accept disembarkation in its ports poses a significant gap 
in the duty to rescue.416 Apart from this, it has been proven that although this duty is a 
fundamental part of international law, the lack of incorporation is a significant shortcoming to 
the implementation of this duty. Lastly, maritime interception has resulted in States evading 
their duties under international human rights law, refugee law, as well as the ‘non-refoulement’ 
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principle. As a result, there are also significant gaps in the protection available to irregular 
migrants with regard to the safety risks faced in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Having discussed the shortcomings and gaps in protection that is apparent in the international 
legal framework, Chapter five will be the conclusion and recommendations. The new draft 
legislation of the United Nations will be critically analysed in order to determine if the gaps 
that exist under our current regimes are filled by this new draft legislation and whether or not 
this document will be sufficient to encourage change in domestic and regional laws on 
migration. This, along with other recommendations will be made before concluding this 
dissertation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will begin by providing a retrospective of the foregoing chapters and their 
findings. Following this, several recommendations will be made relating to the protection gaps 
and shortcomings in the international legal framework that seeks to protect irregular migrants 
from risk during their voyage across the Mediterranean Sea.  
 
5.2 Summative Assessment of Chapters 
Chapter 1 briefly discussed the background and history of this study. The terms ‘irregular 
migration’ and ‘irregular migrant’ were then defined and explained, followed by the research 
objectives, research questions, parameters and research methodology, and the architecture of 
the dissertation. This chapter provided an overview of the entire study and elaborated on the 
focus and limitations of the study, such as the geographical and temporal parameters.  
Chapter 2 began with an account of the Kurdi family, shedding some light on the 
‘Mediterranean Migration Crisis of 2015’. The crisis was then broken down and explained 
before looking at the situation in the Mediterranean Sea today. A few recent incidents were 
then discussed, proving that irregular migration is still a major problem in the Mediterranean 
Sea today. A statistical analysis was done using graphs and available data to compare irregular 
migrant attempted crossings and arrivals from the years 2014-2016 and then 2017-2018. This 
clearly shows that although the crisis of 2015 led to spikes in the death toll, the Mediterranean 
Sea is still a deadly route for irregular migrants today.  
The chapter then looked at what the safety and security risks faced by irregular migrants who 
attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea are. The security risks identified were: abuse and 
exploitation by smugglers and state officials, human trafficking, sexual and gender-based 
violence, being detained, tortured, and lastly being subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment. The safety risks identified were: ocean perils, unseaworthy and overcrowded 
vessels, safety of life, interception operations, ‘refoulement’ or being ‘pushed back’, rescue 
operations, and lastly disembarkation in a place of safety once rescued. These risks were 
discussed in detail before concluding the chapter. 
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Chapter 3 began with the security risks faced by irregular migrants, and looked specifically to 
the Smuggling and Trafficking Protocols, to see the international standards that States had to 
meet to adequately protect irregular migrants. A brief discussion of international human rights 
laws as well as international refugee law was done, to show all protections available to irregular 
migrants. Having discussed the legal framework relating to security risks, safety risks are then 
discussed, beginning with the duty to rescue at sea. The international refugee law principle of 
non-refoulement was explained before a discussion on maritime interception. The limitations 
to interception were then discussed, clearly proving that interception is not an absolute right of 
States and that they are bound by other rules of international law. 
Chapter 4 started off by looking at the laws dealing with the security risks and more 
specifically, at the Smuggling Protocol. The definition of ‘migrant smuggling’ proved to be 
problematic in practice, leading to most States departing from the definition in the Smuggling 
Protocol. This was discussed in detail, along with all the problems that occur as a result of 
States adopting stricter definitions in their domestic laws. The protection gaps and 
shortcomings were analysed by comparing this to the Trafficking Protocol and the 
effectiveness of anti-trafficking law as opposed to anti-smuggling laws. The Trafficking 
Protocol was then analysed, noting that in practice irregular migrants who have been trafficked 
are vulnerable to being labelled as smuggled instead. This is a protection gap as anti-smuggling 
laws view irregular migrants in a negative light and offer little to no protection.  
Moving on to the safety risks, the duty to rescue was broken down into practical problems that 
exist due to disembarkation and finding a place of safety. This is another significant gap in the 
legal framework, as it can lead to irregular migrants being pushed back to other countries. In 
addition to this, there are numerous disincentives to the duty to rescue that results from anti-
smuggling laws. The case of Cap Anamur was discussed, highlighting that anti-smuggling laws 
target humanitarian acts of rescue and sanction the duty to rescue. This then leads to seafarers 
turning away and ignoring distress calls made by irregular migrants at sea. 
 
5.3 Key Findings 
5.3.1 What safety and security risks do irregular migrants face at sea? 
As discussed above, Chapter 2 identified all the safety and security risks faced by irregular 
migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. The security risks were highlighted first and were discussed 
in detail, including several accounts of irregular migrants’ experiences. As mentioned, the 
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security risks identified were: abuse and exploitation by smugglers and state officials, human 
trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, being detained, tortured, and lastly being 
subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The safety risks were then highlighted 
and once again, a few accounts of irregular migrants were discussed. The safety risks identified 
were: ocean perils, unseaworthy and overcrowded vessels, safety of life, interception 
operations, ‘refoulement’ or being ‘pushed back’, rescue operations, and lastly disembarkation 
in a place of safety once rescued. These risks were discussed in detail before concluding the 
chapter. The research question above was answered in this Chapter, as the chapter clearly 
identified all the safety and security risks faced by irregular migrants on their voyage across 
the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
5.3.2 Are there any laws or regulatory measures in place to protect irregular migrants from 
the safety and security risks faced at sea? 
Chapter 3 began by discussing each security risk and then safety risk that is faced by irregular 
migrants in the Mediterranean Sea and the international legal framework that is in place 
surrounding these risks. All the relevant international conventions and treaties were identified 
and discussed to prove the protection that is available to irregular migrants from these safety 
and security risks faced at sea. The research question above was adequately dealt with and 
answered in this Chapter, as it clearly proves that there are laws and regulatory measures in 
place to protect irregular migrants from the safety and security risks faced in the Mediterranean 
Sea. 
 
5.3.3 Are irregular migrants adequately protected by the current legal framework? 
Chapter 4 dealt specifically with this research question and sought to answer it by critiquing 
and analysing the international legal framework and regulatory measures in place to protect 
irregular migrants from the safety and security risks faced at sea. The gaps and shortcomings 
of the legal framework were discussed in detail, clearly proving that the protection available to 
irregular migrants is not adequate. There are significant gaps in the current legal framework, 
as discussed. In addition to these gaps, States have failed to incorporate and implement the 
existing legal obligations in their domestic laws and practice. This chapter highlights the 
reasons why States have failed to implement and incorporate existing legal protections and the 
problems that arise for irregular migrants as a result. 
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5.4 Recommendations 
It is recommended that an anti-smuggling industry needs to be created to ensure that States 
adhere to the protections set out in the Smuggling Protocol and implement them into their 
domestic laws. Checks and balances need to be in place to ensure that States are accountable 
for their actions when going against the obligations in the Smuggling Protocol. This can be 
done by creating an ad hoc committee to deal with such discrepancies and keep States in line 
with their international obligations. It is also recommended that an international court or forum 
should be created to deal with disputes and violations of international standards. The United 
Nations Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Ordinary Migration together with the Global 
Compact for Refugees, provide excellent guidelines in this regard, however, their status as non-
binding is not ideal, and it is recommended that binding legislation should be implemented. 
States are well aware of their obligations under international law, such as the duty to rescue 
and the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ when intercepting vessels on the high seas, however, as 
has been shown, because these obligations can be burdensome States try to sidestep them. It is 
thus recommended that creating a new binding legislation may be necessary and if not, then 
the existing legal framework should be amended, as recommended below. The framework 
should be amended so that it is more comprehensive and clarifies the definitions and content 
of certain key terms. One of the duties that should be further clarified is the duty to disembark. 
As discussed throughout this study, this obligation can be found in several maritime 
conventions, but the actual criteria for disembarkation and the State responsible for this, have 
not been established. Thus, it is recommended that suitable criteria should be included in a 
binding maritime convention.  
Although the IMO Guidelines define a place of safety, this definition cannot be found in any 
of the legally binding maritime treaties or conventions. It is recommended that this definition 
be included in a binding maritime convention. The definition should establish that a place of 
safety envisages a place on land, in a country that is a party to the Refugee Convention. This 
not only provides clarification of a place of safety, it also safeguards irregular migrants in need 
of international protection. The difference between a rescue operation and an act of interception 
also needs to be clarified in a legally binding maritime convention. It is thus recommended that 
the maritime conventions should be amended to include a provision explaining what a rescue 
operation is and what an act of interception is, so as to differentiate between the two.  
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5.5 Final Remarks 
The final conclusions reached in this study prove that irregular migrants are not adequately 
protected by the laws in place and that there are significant gaps and shortcomings in the 
international legal framework. The research undertaken in this study clearly illustrates the gaps 
and shortcomings in the protection available to irregular migrants. The recommendations 
provided above allow for these gaps and shortcomings to be dealt with and remedies the 
problems faced. It is submitted that new binding international legislation needs to be made to 
remedy the significant gaps in the international legal framework.  
 
‘While irregular migration has come to be seen in many European countries, as a “threat” to 
their security, the security of migrants is also equally under threat. This also means that any 
attempt at addressing the current “migration crisis” in the Mediterranean in a comprehensive 
manner should take into account not only the security of the receiving states, but also the 
“human security” of the migrants seeking to reach Europe.’417 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
417 D Lutterbeck (2014) at 131. 
69 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources: 
Conventions 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea, 1184 UNTS 278. 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue, 1405 UNTS 118. 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention on Salvage, 1953 UNTS 
165. 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto. 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women 
and Children and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/25.  
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3. 
United Nations General Assembly, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85. Adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 39/46. 
United Nations General Assembly, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 
UNTS 137. 
United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 
UNTS 171.  
United Nations General Assembly, 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 UNTS 267. 
 
Foreign legislation 
Council Directive 2002/90 defining the Facilitation of Unauthorised Entry, Transit and 
Residence (OJ L328/17). 
European Convention of Human Rights, CETS no. 194. 
70 
 
Framework Decision on the Strengthening of the Penal Framework to Prevent the Facilitation 
of Unauthorised Entry, Transit and Residence 2002/946 (OJ L328/1). 
 
Foreign cases 
Cap Anamur, Tribunale di Agrigento, I Sezione Penale, I Collegio, 954/2009, Case No. 
3267/04 R.G.N.R. 
Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy, Application no. 27765/09, 55 European Court of Human Rights 
627 (23 February 2012). 
 
Secondary Sources: 
Books 
Brian, T, Laczko, F Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration Geneva: 
International Organization for Migration, (2014). 
Frigo, M Migration and International Human Rights Law: A Practitioners Guide 2 ed Geneva: 
International Commission of Jurists, (2014). 
Gallagher, A ‘Whatever Happened to the Migrant Smuggling Protocol?’ in M McAuliffe and 
MK Solomon (Conveners) Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration Geneva: International Organization for Migration, (2017). 
Goodwin-Gill, GS, McAdam, J The Refugee in International Law 3 ed New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc., (2007). 
Guilfoyle, D Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea New York: Cambridge University 
Press, (2009). 
Lutterbeck, D ‘A View from the Ground: Human Security Threats to Irregular Migrants across 
the Mediterranean’ in O Grech & M Wohlfeld (eds) Migration in the Mediterranean: 
Human Rights, Security and Development Perspectives Msida: Mediterranean 
Academy of Diplomatic Studies, (2014). 
Manderson, D ‘Not Drowning, Waving: Images, History, and the Representation of Asylum 
Seekers’ in M Dickie, D Gozdecka, & S Reich (eds) Unintended Consequences: The 
impact of migration law and policy Canberra: ANU Press (2016). 
71 
 
McAuliffe, M, Mence, V ‘Irregular maritime migration as a global phenomenon’ in M 
McAuliffe & K Koser A Long Way to Go: Irregular Migration Patterns, Processes, 
Drivers and Decision-making Canberra: ANU Press, (2017). 
Moreno-Lax, V The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (mal)practice in Europe 
and Australia Policy Brief 4 Sydney: Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, 
(2017). 
 
Journal Articles 
Aljehani, A ‘The Legal Definition of the Smuggling of Migrants in Light of the Provisions of 
the Migrant Smuggling Protocol’ (2015) 79(2) The Journal of Criminal Law 122-137. 
Andersson, R ‘Europe's failed ‘fight’ against irregular migration: ethnographic notes on a 
counterproductive industry’ (2016) 42(7) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
1055–1075. 
Attard, F ‘Is the Smuggling Protocol a Viable Solution to the Contemporary Problem of Human 
Smuggling on the High Seas’ (2016) 47(2) Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 219-
248. 
Baer, CJ ‘A Firm Foundation: A Defense of the UN Trafficking Protocol’ (2012) 3(1) Grove 
City College Journal of Law and Public Policy 103-122. 
Basaran, T ‘Saving Lives at Sea: Security, Law and Adverse Effects’ (2014) 16 European 
Journal of Migration & Law 365-387. 
Brolan, C ‘An Analysis of the Human Smuggling Trade and the Protocol against the Smuggling 
of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2000) from a Refugee Protection Perspective’ (2002) 
14(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 561-596. 
Düvell, F ‘Paths into Irregularity: The Legal and Political Construction of Irregular Migration’ 
(2011) 13 European Journal of Migration & Law 275-295. 
Düvell, F ‘The ‘Great Migration’ of summer 2015: analysing the assemblage of key drivers in 
Turkey’ (2018) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1-14. 
Freedman, J ‘Engendering Security at the Borders of Europe: Women Migrants and the 
Mediterranean ‘Crisis’’ (2016) 29(4) Journal of Refugee Studies 568-582. 
Frelick, B, Kysel, IM, Podkul, J ‘The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the 
Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants’ (2016) 4(4) Journal on Migration and 
Human Security 190-220. 
72 
 
Gallagher, A ‘Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant 
Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 975-1004. 
Garelli, G, Sciurba, A, Tazzioli, M ‘Introduction: Mediterranean Movements and the 
Reconfiguration of the Military-Humanitarian Border in 2015’ (2018) 50(3) Antipode 
662-672. 
Gjerdingen, E ‘Suffocation inside a Cold Storage Truck and Other Problems with Trafficking 
as “Exploitation” and Smuggling as “Choice” Along the Thai-Burmese Border’ (2009) 
26 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 699-737. 
Gruijters, RJ, Steinhilper, E ‘A Contested Crisis: Policy Narratives and Empirical Evidence on 
Border Deaths in the Mediterranean’ (2018) 52(3) Sociology 515-533. 
Hathaway, JC ‘The Human Rights Quagmire of Human Trafficking’ (2008) 49(1) Virginia 
Journal of International Law 1-59. 
Hartati, AS ‘Criminalization of the Smuggling of Migrants in Accordance with the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air’ (2013) 11(1) Indonesian Journal of 
International Law 19-48. 
Hernández-Carretero, M, Carling, J ‘Beyond “Kamikaze Migrants”: Risk Taking in West 
African Boat Migration to Europe’ (2012) 71(4) Human Organization 407-416. 
Jeandesboza, J, Pallister-Wilkins, P ‘Crisis, Routine, Consolidation: The Politics of the 
Mediterranean Migration Crisis’ 2016 Mediterranean Politics 1-5. 
Jumbert, MG ‘Control or rescue at sea? Aims and limits of border surveillance technologies in 
the Mediterranean Sea’ (2018) 42(4) Disasters 674-696. 
Kilpatrick, RLJ, Smith, A ‘The International Legal Obligation to Rescue during Mass 
Migration at Sea: Navigating the Sovereign and Commercial Dimensions of a 
Mediterranean Crisis’ (2015) 28(2) University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 
141-194. 
Klug, A ‘Strengthening the Protection of Migrants and Refugees in Distress at Sea through 
International Cooperation and Burden-Sharing’ (2014) 26(1) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 48-64. 
Mainwaring, C, Brigden, N ‘Beyond the Border: Clandestine Migration Journeys’ (2016) 21(2) 
Geopolitics 243-262. 
Mallia, P ‘The Challenges of Irregular Maritime Migration’ in Jean Monnet Occasional Papers 
No. 4 (2013) 1-15. 
73 
 
Miltner, B ‘Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and 
Interception’ (2006) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 75-125. 
Miltner, B ‘The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: A Clash of the Titans' Obligations’ (2015) 
22(1) Brown Journal of World Affairs 213-237. 
Moreno-Lax, V ‘Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU 
Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea’ (2011) 23(2) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 174-220. 
Moser, R ‘Addressing the Failures of International Asylum Law in Regard to Victims of 
Human Trafficking’ (2018) 4 Journal of Global Justice and Public Policy 1-32. 
Pallis, M ‘Obligations of States towards Asylum Seekers at Sea: Interactions and Conflicts 
Between Legal Regimes’ (2002) 14 International Journal of Refugee Law 329-357. 
Papanicolopulu, I ‘The duty to rescue at sea, in peacetime and in war: A general overview’ 
(2016) 98(2) International Review of the Red Cross 491-514. 
Ratcovich, M ‘The Concept of 'Place of Safety': Yet Another Self-Contained Maritime Rule or 
a Sustainable Solution to the Ever-Controversial Question of Where to Disembark 
Migrants Rescued at Sea?’ (2015) 33 Australian Year Book of International Law 81-
129. 
Ray, SB ‘Saving Lives’ (2017) 58 Boston College Law Review 1225-1277. 
Sanchez, G ‘Critical Perspectives on Clandestine Migration Facilitation: An Overview of 
Migrant Smuggling Research’ (2017) 5(1) Journal on Migration & Human Security 9-
27. 
Wagner, D ‘A Push to the Sea: A Global Analysis of Immigration by the Sea: A United States 
Coast Guard Policy Expansion in Preparation for an Influx of Migrants Via the Sea’ 
(2015) 14(2) Loyola Maritime Law Journal 302-334. 
 
Reports and Policy papers  
Black, J, Singleton, A, Malakooti, A The Central Mediterranean route: Deadlier than ever 
Issue No. 3 Global Migration Data Analysis Centre: Data Briefing Series, (2016) 
available at 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/gmdac_data_briefing_series_issue3.pdf, 
accessed on 16 August 2018. 
Berry, M, Garcia-Blanco, I, Moore, K Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in 
the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries United Nations High 
74 
 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), (2016) available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/56bb369c9/press-coverage-refugee-
migrant-crisis-eu-content-analysis-five-european.html, accessed on 17 August 2018. 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, IMO Resolution 167(78), IMO Doc. 
MSC 78/26/Add.2. Annex 34. 
IOM: Missing Migrants Project Mediterranean Update: Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals and 
Fatalities, (2018) available at https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean-update, 
accessed on 27 August 2018. 
UNHCR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Conclusion on 
Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures, No. 97 (LIV) (10 October 2003). 
Contained in United Nations General Assembly Document A/AC.96/987 and Document 
12A (A/58/12/Add.1). 
United Nations General Assembly Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux 
préparatoires) of the negotiation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (A/55/383/Add.1). 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Desperate Journeys: January 
2017-March 2018, (2018) available at 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/63039, accessed on 20 August 2018. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Europe Monthly Report, (7 
August 2018) available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65078, 
accessed on 24 August 2018. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugees & Migrants arrivals to 
Europe in 2018 (Mediterranean), (2018) available at 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/64891, accessed on 20 August 2018. 
 
Media Reports  
‘Aquarius: Migrant rescue ship returns to Libyan coast’ DW 1 August 2018, available at 
https://www.dw.com/en/aquarius-migrant-rescue-ship-returns-to-libyan-coast/a-
44904769, accessed on 20 August 2018. 
Barnard, A ‘Remembering Alan Kurdi: Syrian Family’s Tragedy Goes Beyond Image of Boy 
on Beach’ New York Times 27 December 2015, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/world/middleeast/syria-refugees-alan-aylan-
kurdi.html?smid=pl-share, accessed on 13 August 2018. 
75 
 
Barnard, A, Shoumali, K ‘Image of Drowned Syrian, Aylan Kurdi, 3, Brings Migrant Crisis 
Into Focus’ New York Times 3 September 2015, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/syria-boy-drowning.html, accessed 
on 13 August 2018. 
Davies, L ‘At least two dozen killed after boat capsizes near Lampedusa’ The Guardian 11 
October 2013, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/11/two-
dozen-killed-boat-capsizes-lampedusa, accessed on 25 August 2018. 
‘EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes Over Rescues Put Lives at Risk’ Human Rights Watch 25 July 2018, 
available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/25/eu/italy/libya-disputes-over-
rescues-put-lives-risk, accessed on 16 August 2018. 
‘Five things to know about the Aquarius refugee ship’ Al Jazeera 13 June 2018, available at 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/aquarius-refugee-ship-
180613132710742.html, accessed on 17 August 2018. 
‘Immigration to Italy: a look at the numbers’ The Local Italy 12 June 2018, available at 
https://www.thelocal.it/20180612/immigration-to-italy-numbers, accessed on 12 June 
2019. 
Lindsay, D ‘11 October 2013 migrant tragedy: Italians navy officers placed under 
investigation’ The Independent 23 October 2013, available at 
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2016-10-23/local-news/11-October-2013-
migrant-tragedy-Italians-navy-officers-placed-under-investigation-6736165560, 
accessed on 25 August 2018. 
Momigliano, A ‘Italian forces ignored a sinking ship full of Syrian refugees and let more than 
250 drown, says leaked audio’ The Washington Post 9 May 2017, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/09/italian-forces-
ignored-a-sinking-ship-full-of-syrian-refugees-and-let-more-than-250-drown-says-
leaked-audio/?utm_term=.8fd37592fa2a, accessed on 25 August 2018. 
Politi, J ‘Italy refuses port access to migrant rescue boat’ Financial Times 11 June 2018, 
available at https://www.ft.com/content/7c6b73a4-6cfe-11e8-92d3-6c13e5c92914, 
accessed on 17 August 2018. 
Rayner, G ‘Aylan and Galip Kurdi: Everything we know about drowned Syrian refugee boys’ 
The Telegraph 3 September 2015, available at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11841802/eu-migrant-crisis-
refugee-boys-aylan-galip-kurdi.html, accessed on 13 August 2018. 
Smith, H ‘Seven Syrian Migrants Drown off of Greek Coast’ The Guardian 19 March 2014, 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/syrian-migrantsdrown-
greece, accessed on 20 August 2018. 
76 
 
Spindler, W ‘2015: The year of Europe's refugee crisis’ UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency 8 
December 2015, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee 
crisis.html?query=the%20mediterranean%20migration%252%E2%80%A6, accessed 
on 20 August 2018. 
Stagno-Navarra, K ‘Migrant deaths as boat capsizes off Malta’ Al-Jazeera 12 October 2013, 
available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/10/migrant-boat-capsizes-
near-italy-20131011164942554158.html, accessed on 25 August 2018. 
Steinbuch, Y ‘Photo of drowned toddler causes outcry over migrant crisis’ New York Post 2 
September 2015, available at https://nypost.com/2015/09/02/photo-of-drowned-
toddler-causes-outcry-over-migrant-crisis/, accessed on 13 August 2018. 
Tharoor, I ‘Death of drowned Syrian toddler Aylan Kurdi jolts world leaders’ The Washington 
Post 3 September 2015, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/03/image-of-drowned-
syrian-toddler-aylan-kurdi-jolts-world-
leaders/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6f1d8dd40916, accessed on 15 August 2018.  
‘2015 Valletta Summit on Migration’ The Africa-EU Partnership 18 November 2015, available 
at https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/stay-informed/news/2015-valletta-
summit-migration, accessed on 12 June 2019. 
 
Other internet sources 
‘IMO guidelines for the unwanted person onboard-Stowaway’ Marine Insight 19 April 2019, 
available at https://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/imo-guidelines-for-the-
unwanted-person-onboard-stowaway/, accessed on 12 June 2019. 
Park, J ‘Europe’s Migration Crisis’ Council on Foreign Relations 23 September 2015, 
available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis, accessed on 
18 August 2018. 
Metcalfe-Hough, V The migration crisis? Facts, challenges and possible solutions London: 
Overseas Development Institute, (2015) available at 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/9913.pdf, accessed on 1 December 2018. 
77 
 
 
 
